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1. Andy Portinga, ABA Accreditation of Law Schools: An Antitrust Analysis, 29 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 635, 670 (1996); see also Henry Ramsey, Jr., The History, Organization,
and Accomplishments of the American Bar Association Accreditation Process, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 267, 272 (1995) (proclaiming the ABA and law schools are the “gatekeepers
to the profession”). Ramsey’s statements were made at a Deans’ Workshop during the
ABA’s mid-winter meeting in February 1995. At the time, the ABA was under investigation
by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) for alleged anti-competitive activity. The
DOJ filed its complaint against the ABA alleging antitrust violations on June 27, 1995, and
simultaneously filed an agreed stipulation with the ABA for the entry of a Final Judgment
along with a Competitive Impact Statement. See Complaint and Stipulation and Competitive
Impact Statement, United States v. ABA, 934 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1996) (noting the “year
long” investigation). On the same day the DOJ issued a press release announcing the
proposed settlement. See Proposed Settlement, United States v. ABA, 934 F. Supp. 435
(D.D.C. 1996) (on file with authors). Then, on August 2, 1995, the DOJ filed its Proposed
Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. ABA, 60 Fed. Reg.
39,421 (Dep’t Justice Aug. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Proposed Final Judgment]. See also United
States’ Response to Public Comments About Proposed Modifications of Final Judgment,
United States v. ABA, 934 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1996). Ramsey’s speech was designed to
cheer-up the troops and to quell voices of dissent.
2. Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of
the Justification for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 429, 435 nn.16-17
(2001). See generally NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS & ABA SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. &
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS (Erica
Moeser & Margaret Fuller Corneille eds., 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org
(accessed from homepage by selecting Search and entering phrase “Bar Admission
Requirements”) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
3. Christopher T. Cunniffe, The Case for the Alternative Third-Year Program, 61 ALB.
L. REV. 85, 145 (1997). The Montana Supreme Court stated that it did “not have the
expertise or the resources to conduct independent reviews of non-ABA approved law schools
to determine which such schools offer the quality legal education we seek to obtain from
Montana Bar applicants.” In re Culver (Mont. Sup. Ct. Order Feb. 2, 2002). However, a few
states have chosen to maintain local control over law school education and provide for state
approval in addition to ABA accreditation. See, e.g., ALASKA R. BAR RULE 2, § 1(b) (West
2003) (providing for ABA or the Association of American Law Schools, which has now
ceded accreditation to the ABA); CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 6060 (West 2003); CAL. ADMIS. RULE
19, § 3 (West 2003); MASS. R. S. CT. RULE 3:01, § 3.3 (West 2003); MICH. R. BD. LAW
EXAM’RS RULE 2(B) (West 2003); TENN. SUP. CT. RULE 7, art. 2, § 2.03 (West 2003); VT.
I. INTRODUCTION
The American Bar Association (ABA) has become “the gatekeeper to
the legal profession.”1 Approximately forty-five states require graduation
from an ABA-accredited law school as a prerequisite to bar admission.2
Despite a growing uneasiness about the ABA accreditation process, most
state supreme courts and legislatures have deferred to the ABA for
accreditation decision-making, which some contend “amounts to an
abdication of political responsibility.”3 Those critical of the current
4 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1
STAT., GOV. CODE § 82.024 (West 2003); VT. R. ADMIS. § 6 (West 2002); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-.3926 (Michie 2002).
4. See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover v. ABA, 846 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff’d,
107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997). One outspoken critic
suggests that “the accreditation system’s restrictions on market entry limit the availability
and the diversity of both legal education and legal services and, thereby, impose substantial
social costs.” John S. Elson, The Governmental Maintenance of the Privileges of Legal
Academia: A Case Study in Classic Rent-Seeking and a Challenge to Our Democratic
Ideology, 15 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 269, 271 (2001).
5. Portinga, supra note 1, at 637.
6. Id. (quoting An Open Letter to the Deans of the ABA Accredited Law Schools). The
number of law school deans dissatisfied with the ABA accreditation process is evident by
the growing number of deans who have become members of the American Law School
Deans Association (ALSDA), which has been very critical of the ABA accreditation process.
More than 100 deans are members of the ALSDA. See also infra Appendix B; Luis M.
Acosta, Reforming the Legal Profession: Implications for Law Librarianship, 94 LAW LIBR.
J. 121, 123 (2002) (reviewing DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE: REFORMING
THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000)) (“The accreditation standards of the American Bar
Association (ABA) attempt to ensure quality of educational outputs by detailed regulation
of educational inputs, such as facilities, resources, and faculty-student contact, but there is
little evidence that these factors are correlated with the quality of educational outputs.”).
accreditation process became more vocal following a lawsuit filed on
November 23, 1993, against the ABA by a Massachusetts law school.4
Shortly thereafter, the deans of fourteen law schools, including the
University of Chicago, Harvard and Stanford, sent an open letter to the
deans of every ABA-accredited law school, urging that the accreditation
process be reformed.5 The letter, in part, stated the following:
We find the current process overly intrusive, inflexible, concerned
with details not relevant to school quality (perhaps even at odds
with maintaining quality), and terribly costly in administrative time
as well as actual dollar costs to schools. . . .
. . . .
It is this sense of responsibility that gives rise to our concern
that the accreditation process for law schools is heading in the
wrong direction. Our varied visions of legal education focus on the
results of the educational process, on the outputs of legal
education—about the sort of graduates we produce, about the sort
of lives they will lead, about the consequences of our writing and
teaching. In contrast, the ABA’s accreditation process increasingly
concentrates on inputs . . . .6
The Department of Justice (DOJ) began investigating the ABA in
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7. Shortly after Massachusetts School of Law filed an anti-ABA lawsuit on November
23, 1993, the law school forwarded documents obtained by discovery to the DOJ in 1994.
These documents are on file with the authors. See also supra note 1.
8. See Complaint and Stipulation and Competitive Impact Statement, United States v.
ABA, 934 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1996).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
10. United States v. ABA, 934 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1996).
11. Denise Rothbardt, ABA Accreditation: Educational Standards and Its Focus on
Output Requirements, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 461, 492 (1999).
12. See Portinga, supra note 1, at 669-70; see also John S. Elson, Why and How the
Practicing Bar Must Rescue American Legal Education from the Misguided Priorities of
American Legal Academia, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1135 (1997).
13. Staver v. ABA, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1374 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
14. See Barry University: Academics, available at http://www.barry.edu (accessed from
homepage by selecting Academics) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
1994,7 and on June 27, 1995, the DOJ filed a federal antitrust action,8
claiming that the ABA accreditation process violated the Sherman Act.9 On
June 25, 1996, the ABA agreed to the entry of a consent decree, which
required the ABA to modify its accreditation process.10
Despite the consent decree, the ABA accreditation process remains
flawed at its very core. The typical assumption by those not familiar with
the ABA accreditation process is that ABA accreditation equates to quality
education outputs. Unfortunately, the ABA accreditation process
“increasingly concentrates on inputs”11 and thus tends to hurt, rather than
help, the quality of legal education.12
To understand the flaws of the ABA accreditation process, this article
will overview the experience of Barry University School of Law (Barry)
with ABA accreditation. Section II will discuss the development and
structure of the ABA. Section III will argue that the ABA’s delegation of
authority to an internal advisory body to render accreditation decisions,
which bind the ABA, is an ultra vires act forbidden both by the laws of its
state of incorporation and by the ABA Constitution. Section IV will then
discuss the ABA accreditation process as applied to Barry. In Section V,
this article will address federal antitrust concerns of ABA accreditation.
To set the backdrop against which the ABA accreditation will be
discussed, a brief introduction of Barry is necessary at this stage.
Throughout this article, more detail about the accreditation process
involving Barry will be discussed where appropriate.
Barry is a law school located in Orlando, Florida.13 The School of Law
is one of ten colleges of Barry University, a successful private school
located in Miami, Florida.14 In 1999, Barry filed an application with the
6 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1
15. Staver, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1374.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See In re Barry Univ. Sch. of Law, 821 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 2002).
19. Staver, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1375; see also Council Action Letter from John A.
Sebert, Consultant on Legal Education to the ABA, to Sister Jeanne O’Laughlin, President,
Barry University and Stanley M. Talcott, Dean, Barry University School of Law (Feb. 26,
2001) (filed in Staver, 169 F. Supp. 1372, Exhibit 6 (M.D. Fla. 2001), available at
http://www.lc.org (accessed from homepage by selecting ABA Accreditation Research,
Complaint Exhibits, then Council Action Letter) (last visited Apr. 15) [hereinafter Letter
from Sebert]. The Florida Legislature authorized the opening of two state-supported schools,
both of which admitted their inaugural class in the Fall of 2002. These include Florida
International University College of Law located in Miami, Florida and Florida A&M
University College of Law located in Orlando, Florida.
20. Staver, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1375.
21. Id.
22. See Supplemental Site Evaluation Team Report on Barry University of Orlando
School of Law at 1 (Nov. 28, 2001) (on file with the authors) [hereinafter Barry
Supplemental Site Report].
ABA for provisional accreditation.15 The ABA sent a site evaluation team
to Barry’s campus and the team prepared a report which was submitted to
the ABA Accreditation Committee.16 Upon consideration of a second
report, the Accreditation Committee notified Barry on February 6, 2001, of
its recommendation that the school receive provisional approval,17 which
would allow graduates to practice law upon successful passage of the bar.18
However, on February 17, 2001, the ABA Council of the Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar (Council) reversed the Accreditation
Committee, citing, as one of four reasons, competition among law schools,
including a new state law school that planned to begin operations in
Orlando at some time in the future.19
Barry initially requested that the ABA House of Delegates (House)
“review” the Council’s decision in hopes that the Council would reconsider
the denial.20 However, a few weeks before the matter was to come up
before the House in early August 2001, the Council agreed to send out a
new site evaluation team in September 2001 and to again review the matter
in February 2002.21 
 From November 1, 2001 through November 3, 2001, the Accreditation
Committee reviewed the updated Supplemental Site Evaluation Team
Report on Barry University of Orlando School of Law and issued its
recommendation on November 28, 2001.22 The Accreditation Committee
denied provisional approval solely on the basis of competition with the new
state law school, which was still some years away from opening its doors
2003] ACCREDITATION PROCESS 7
23.  Id. 
24. For a more detailed discussion of the Barry Supplemental Site Report and the
Accreditation Committee Report No. 2, available at http://www.lc.org (accessed from
homepage by selecting the topic of ABA Accreditation Research,  ABA Evaluation Reports
on Barry University School of Law, then Accreditation Committee Report, 11-2001) (last
visited Feb. 17, 2003). See infra Section IV.B.1.
25. Staver, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
26. See discussion infra Section IV.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See discussion infra Section IV.B.2.
30. ABA Profile: History, available at http://www.abanet.org (accessed from homepage
by selecting Search and entering phrase “Profile of the American Bar Association”) (last
visited Mar. 30, 2003).
31. See About the ABA, available at http://www.abanet.org (accessed from homepage
by selecting FAQs then About the ABA) (last visited May 13, 2003).
32. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (2000); ABA Articles of Incorporation, available at
http://www.cyberdriveillinois.com (accessed from Corporation/LLC Search Page by entering
search term “American Bar Association”) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003) (also on file with the
Illinois Secretary of State).
to the first student.23 The academic program and outputs of Barry were not
criticized by the Accreditation Committee.24
After immense pressure, including a federal antitrust lawsuit filed on
behalf of students and graduates of Barry, along with attorneys who
employed or sought to employ them,25 intense local and national media
criticism of the ABA’s handling of Barry, and pressure from Florida’s
governor, attorney general and legislature,26 the ABA finally granted Barry
provisional accreditation.27 On February 2, 2002, the Council met at the
ABA mid-year meeting in Philadelphia, at which time the Council reversed
the Accreditation Committee and voted to grant Barry provisional
accreditation.28 On February 4, 2002, the House accepted the Council’s
decision.29
II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF ABA ACCREDITATION
The ABA was founded in 1878,30 and is “the largest voluntary
professional association in the world.”31 The ABA is incorporated in the
state of Illinois as a nonprofit corporation and is recognized by the Internal
Revenue Service as a nonprofit, tax-exempt 501(c)(6) “business league” or
trade association.32 Under Illinois law, an Illinois nonprofit corporation may
establish an advisory body that “may not act on behalf of the corporation
or bind it to any action but may make recommendations to the board of
8 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1
33. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.40(d) (West 1993).
34. Due to the inherent conflict of a trade association accrediting its own profession,
the DOE requires that the accrediting body be “separate and independent” from the
association itself. This requirement is designed to avoid self-serving interests of the
association.
35. See 34 C.F.R. § 602.3(d) (1994-99), recodified effective July 1, 2000, at 34 C.F.R.
§ 602.14(a)-(b); 64 Fed. Reg. 56612, 56618-19 (Oct. 20, 1999). This restructuring of the
ABA began in August 1999 and culminated in February 2001. The current structure is
discussed in more detail infra Section II.C.
36. ABA Profile: Structure, available at http://www.abanet.org (accessed from
homepage by selecting Search and entering phrase “Profile of the American Bar
Association”) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003); see also ABA CONST. art. 6, available at
http://www.abanet.org (accessed from homepage by selecting ABA Governance then
Constitution and Bylaws) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003). As of August 2002, there were 538
members of the House; however, this number changes from time to time.
37. ABA Leadership: Board of Governors, available at http://www.abanet.org
(accessed from homepage by selecting ABA Governance, then Board of Governors) (last
visited Mar. 30, 2003); ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 7.
38. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.40(a) (West 1993).
39. Id.
40. See infra Section III for a more detailed discussion on this topic.
41. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.40(d) (West 1993).
42. See infra Section III.A. for a discussion of this topic.
directors or to the officers.”33 In order to satisfy the United States
Department of Education’s (DOE) “separate and independent”34
requirement, the ABA vested the Council (an advisory body) with authority
to bind the entire corporation with respect to law school accreditation.35
A. The Structure of the ABA
The control and administration of the ABA is vested in the 538
members of the House of Delegates (House).36 The Board of Governors
(Board) consists of thirty-seven members and has authority to act for the
ABA when the House is not in session.37 Pursuant to the Illinois General
Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986, a corporation may establish
committees.38 “Each committee shall have two or more directors, a majority
of its membership shall be directors, and all committee members shall serve
at the pleasure of the board.”39 The Council is not a committee; it is an
advisory body.40 An advisory body may not act on behalf of nor bind the
corporation.41 
Since August 1999, the Council has violated Illinois law in two ways.
First, the Council now makes decisions binding the ABA with respect to
law school accreditation.42 Second, the Council’s Accreditation of Law
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43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See ABA Articles of Incorporation, supra note 32.
46. Id.; see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/101.01-.17 (West 1993).
47. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.05(a) (West 1993).
48. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.40(a), (c) (West 1993).
49. Members of the Council are elected by ABA members of the Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar. Members of the ABA may join one or more sections
of the ABA. These sections, established by the House pursuant to the ABA Constitution,
focus on various areas of the legal profession. See ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 30, §
30.1. Section members elect members to the Council of each section. Council members are
not appointed by the House or the Board, which constitute the ABA governing board. See
ABA POLICIES AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK (1999).
50. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.40(d) (West 1993) (emphasis added). 
51. Id.
52. Each section of the ABA is governed by a chair and a council. ABA CONST., supra
note 36, art. 30, § 30.5. The House establishes the sections and may discontinue any section.
Id at art. 30, §§ 30.1-30.2. Although members of the sections must be members of the ABA,
non-members may serve on the Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions
to the Bar. Id. at art. 30, § 30.4; ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar:
Section Bylaws, art. IV, § 3, available at http://www.abanet.org (accessed from homepage
by selecting Law Student Resources, Legal Education, Standards & Rules of Procedure, then
Schools Project budget is not subject to review or consultation by the
House or the Board.43 The Council now operates autonomously.44
From the inception of the ABA until 1992, the ABA was an
unincorporated association.45 On December 7, 1992, the ABA incorporated
in Illinois as a nonprofit corporation.46 Under the Illinois statute, the affairs
of a nonprofit corporation must be managed under the direction of the
governing board.47 An Illinois nonprofit corporation may establish a
committee which may render certain binding decisions not otherwise
prohibited by statute.48 The Council is not a committee under the Illinois
statute because less than 51% of the Council’s membership is composed of
members of the House or of the Board, and the members of the Council are
not appointed by the House or by the Board.49
Under Illinois law, an Illinois nonprofit corporation may “appoint
persons to a commission, advisory body or other such body which may or
may not have directors as members, which body may not act on behalf of
the corporation or bind it to any action but may make recommendations to
the board of directors or to the officers.”50 An advisory body may not act
on behalf of the corporation nor bind the corporation to any action; it can
only make recommendations to the governing board or to the officers.51 
Until August 1999, the Council had always functioned as an advisory
body.52 Outside of accrediting law schools, the Council continues to operate
10 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1
Section By-laws) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Legal Educ. Bylaws]. As will be
discussed below, this compromise to allow a few non-members to serve on the Council was
in response to the DOE. See infra Section II.C. Sections are not autonomous and can
exercise only such power as granted to them by the House: “[t]he House . . . shall control,
formulate policy for, and administer the Association.” ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 6,
§ 6.1. The House “shall supervise and direct the Board of Governors, officers, sections,
committees, and employees and agents of the Association.”
53. Except for law school accreditation decisions and the budget for the Accreditation
of Law Schools Project, the Council continues to act like any other council of any other
section, namely, in an advisory capacity to the House. See Legal Educ. Bylaws, supra note
52 art. X; see also ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 45, § 45.9, art. 6, § 6.1.
54. See Legal Educ. Bylaws, supra note 52, art. VI, § 1(b) and art. X; see also
Standards for Approval of Law Schools and Interpretations Rules 6, 10, available at
http://www.abanet.org (accessed from homepage by selecting Law Student Resources, Legal
Education, About the Section, Committees, then Standards for Approval of Law Schools and
Interpretations) [hereinafter Rule or Rules] (last visited May 13, 2003).
55. Legal Educ. Bylaws, supra note 52, art. IV, § 1(b).
56. ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 6, § 6.1.
57. Id. at arts. 7-8, §§ 7.2, 8.2.
58. ABA Profile, available at http://www.abanet.org (accessed from homepage by
selecting FAQs, About the ABA, Media Relations, ABA Information, then Profile) (last
visited Mar. 30, 2003).
59. Id.
60. ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 7, § 7.1.
61. ABA Profile, supra note 58.
62. ABA Approved Law Schools by Year Approved, available at http://www.abanet
.org (accessed from homepage by selecting Law Student Resources, Legal Education, ABA
as an advisory body.53 However, with respect to law school accreditation,
the Council now makes decisions that are binding on the ABA, which
neither the House nor the Board may veto.54 The Accreditation of Law
Schools Project budget is no longer subject to review or consultation by the
Board or any other entity outside of the Council.55 Given these facts, the
Council now operates as an autonomous entity with respect to law school
accreditation and budgetary matters pertaining thereto.
The control and administration of the ABA is vested in the House.56
The House elects the officers of the ABA and the members of the Board.57
Established in 1936, the House meets twice per year, at the ABA annual
and mid-year meetings.58 “At the Midyear Meeting, the Nominating
Committee nominates officers and members of the Board of Governors . . .
[at] the Annual Meeting, the full House votes on these nominees.”59 The
Board has authority to act and speak for the ABA when the House is not in
session.60 The Board “usually meets five times a year. It oversees the
general operation of [the ABA].”61
The ABA first accredited law schools in 1923.62 One of the main
2003] ACCREDITATION PROCESS 11
Approved Law Schools, then Law Schools By Year Approved) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
Before the ABA began accrediting law schools, most attorneys qualified through
independent study and apprenticeships. See Barton, supra note 2; James P. White,
Rededication to Our Core Values: Legal Education in the Public Interest, 31 SW. U. L. REV.
159, 161 (2002).
63. About the ABA, available at http://www.abanet.org (accessed from homepage by
selecting FAQs then About the ABA) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003). For a list of the original
law school accreditation requirements, see White, supra note 62, at 163.
64. Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, available at
http://www.abanet.org (accessed from homepage by selecting Law Student Resources, Legal
Education, then About the Section) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
65. See ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 10, § 10.1(b) (“Section and division bylaws
become effective when approved by the House of Delegates.”).
66.  ABA CONST., supra note 36.
67. See Standards for Approval of Law Schools, available at http://www.abanet.org
(accessed from homepage by selecting Accreditation then Standards for Approval of Law
Schools) (last visited May 30, 2003) [hereinafter Standards].
68. See Rules, supra note 54.
69. Legal Educ. Bylaws, supra note 52, art. VIII, § 1(b); see also Standards, supra note
67, Ch. 1, Standards 101-102 and Interpretation 101-1.
70. See generally Internal Operating Practices: Site Team Evaluators, available at
http://www.abanet.org (accessed from homepage by selecting Law Student Resources, Legal
Education, Standards & Rules of Procedure, then Internal Operating Practices) last visited
May 17, 2003); see also Rule 2, supra note 54.
functions of the ABA is to “provide law school accreditation.”63 The
ABA’s Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (Section)
was created in 1893 as the ABA’s first section.64 The ABA has sections,
divisions and commissions, standing and special committees, forums and
task forces that are part of the ABA, none of which are separately
incorporated.65 Each section has a council and bylaws, but amendments to
the section bylaws become effective only upon approval of the House.66
In 1973, the House adopted the Standards for Approval of Law Schools
(Standards), which set forth the requirements that law schools must meet
in order to be approved.67 The Standards, along with their accompanying
interpretations, relate to many aspects of the operation of law schools,
including admissions, educational requirements, faculty, placement
programs, funding and facilities.68
The Council of the Section established the Accreditation Committee to
recommend provisional or full approval of new law schools and to oversee
and reinspect currently approved law schools.69 An ABA Site Team
prepares a detailed report for the Accreditation Committee, but makes no
conclusions or recommendations.70 After reviewing the Site Team’s report,
the Accreditation Committee makes conclusions based on the facts in the
12 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1
71. See Rule 3, supra note 54.
72. See Rule 6, supra note 54.
73. At the annual meeting of the ABA in August 1999, the House of Delegates
approved amendments to the Rules of Procedure for the House of Delegates (art. 45 § 45.9),
the Bylaws of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (art. IV and art. X)
and more to the Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools (Rules 5 and 6). Until that
time, the Council made accreditation recommendations to the House. The House either voted
to accept or reject these recommendations, and this decision was final.
74. See ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 45, §  45.9; Legal Educ. Bylaws, supra note
52, art. X; Rules 6, 10, supra note 54.
75. See ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 45, §  45.9.
76. See United States’ Response to Public Comments About Proposed Modifications
of Final Judgment, United States v. ABA, 934 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1996) (modifying the
original consent decree to account for the new accreditation process, which was done to
address concerns raised by the DOE in reference to the “separate and independent”
requirement); see also U.S. Department of Education Staff Report to the National Advisory
Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity 3, 6-7 (1997) [hereinafter U.S. Department
of Education Staff Report] (on file with authors) (stating in 1997, prior to the 1999
accreditation changes, that the ABA Council “does not meet either the ‘separate and
independent’ requirement or the conditions for a waiver of that requirement” because “the
council is not the final decision-making body; this responsibility rests with the House of
Delegates.”).
report and makes a recommendation to the Council for or against approving
the school.71 The recommendation is then reviewed by the Council, which
votes to accept or reverse the Accreditation Committee.72 Prior to August
1999, the Council merely made recommendations to the House, which
could affirm or reverse the Council.73 After August 1999, the House may
only remand back to the Council, but the Council’s decision is now final
and binding on the ABA.74 Neither the House nor the Board may reverse
the Council.75
From 1921 to 1999, the House had final authority over accreditation
decisions,76 but in August 1999, the ABA amended the Section Bylaws to
vest final authority over accreditation in the Council of the Section. The
Section Bylaws now provide:
The Council shall develop separate budgets for the Accreditation
of Law Schools Project and for its other activities. Both budgets
shall be prepared pursuant to the generally established accounting
principles used by the Sections and entities within the Association.
The Accreditation of Law Schools Project budget itself, however,
will not be subject to review or consultation by the Board of
Governors or any other entity outside the Section. The budget for
the other activities of the Section will be subject to the
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77. Legal Educ. Bylaws, supra note 52, art. IV, § 1(b) (emphasis added).
78. Id. at art. X.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Legal Educ. Bylaws, supra note 52, art. I, § (2)(a)-(d).
81. See id.; see also ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 45, § 45.9; Legal Educ. Bylaws,
supra note 52, art. X; Rules 6, 10, supra note 54.
82. See ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 49, § 49.5.
83.  Rules 6, 10, supra note 54.
Association’s regular budget process. With respect to those other
activities, the Council shall not authorize commitments for
expenditures in a fiscal year that would exceed the income and
reserves of the Section for that fiscal year without approval of the
Board of Governors.77
 Article X of the Section Bylaws states that while any action of the
Section must be approved by the House or by the Board of the ABA before
the action can be effective, actions relating to the accreditation of law
schools no longer need approval by the House or the Board.78
Any action by this Section must be approved by the House of
Delegates or by the Board of Governors of the American Bar
Association before the action can be effective as the action of the
American Bar Association. Actions taken pursuant to Article I,
Sections 2(a-b) of these Bylaws shall become effective after review
by the House of Delegates, as set forth in the Rules of Procedure
for the Approval of Law Schools.79
Actions taken pursuant to Article I, section (2)(a)-(d) of the Section
Bylaws pertain to the accreditation of law schools.80 While the House or
Board must still approve most of the Section’s activities, neither the House
nor the Board may approve decisions or budgetary matters regarding
accreditation.81
The House may now only “agree” or “refer” back to the Council a
Council decision to grant or deny provisional or full accreditation; the
House may no longer overrule a Council decision regarding accreditation.82
Rules 9 and 10 of the Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools by
the American Bar Association (Rule or Rules) explains the new procedure
for review by the House of the Council’s decision to deny provisional or
full accreditation to law schools.83 Rule 10 states:
A decision by the Council to deny an application for provisional or
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84. Rule 10(a)(3), supra note 54.
85. Id.
86. ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 6, § 6.1 (emphasis added).
87. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
88. United States v. ABA, 934 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1996).
89.  Id. This Consent Decree remains in effect for ten years. Id. at 439. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that a consent decree does not preclude a private suit. See Sam Fox
Publ’g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689-90 (1961); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). 
full approval, is subject to a maximum of two referrals back to the
Council by the House. If the House refers a Council decision back
to the Council twice, then the decision of the Council following the
second referral will be final and will not be subject to further
review by the House.84
The Council’s decision after a second remand is final and binding on the
ABA.85
Despite the amendments to the Section Bylaws and Rules, the ABA
never amended Article 6, section 6.1 of the ABA Constitution, which
provides in relevant part:
The House of Delegates shall control, formulate policy for, and
administer the Association. It has all the powers necessary or
incidental to performing those functions. It shall supervise and
direct the Board of Governors, officers, sections, committees, and
employees and agents of the Association.86
B. The Department of Justice Antitrust Consent Decree
In 1994, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ began an investigation of
ABA accreditation of law schools.87 On June 27, 1995, the DOJ filed a
federal antitrust action against the ABA under § 1 of the Sherman Act.88 A
consent decree was approved on June 25, 1996 (Consent Decree.)89 The
DOJ, in its Complaint, alleged that:
the ABA restrained competition among professional personnel at
ABA-approved law schools by fixing their compensation levels
and working conditions, and by limiting competition from non-
ABA-approved schools. The Complaint also allege[d] that the
ABA allowed its law school accreditation process to be captured
by those with a direct interest in its outcome. Consequently, rather
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90. Proposed Final Judgment, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,421.
91. Id. at 39,425.
92. Id. at 39,426.
93. Id. at 39,427.
94. United States Memorandum in Support of the Joint Motion for Modification of the
Final Judgment at 4, United States v. ABA, No. 95-1211 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2001), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/(accessed from homepage by selecting Antitrust Case Filings, U.S.
v. American Bar Association, then United States’ Memorandum in Support of the Joint
Motion for Modification of the Final Judgment) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003) [hereinafter
Memorandum in Support of the Joint Motion for Modification].
95. See United States v. ABA, 934 F. Supp. 435, 437 (D.D.C. 1996).
96. See 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(a)(3), (b) (2000).
97. See 34 C.F.R. § 602.14(a), (b) (2001) (effective July 1, 2000).
98. United States’ Response to Public Comments About Proposed Final Judgment,
than setting minimum standards for law school quality . . . the
legitimate purpose[] of accreditation, the ABA at times acted as a
guild that protected the interests of professional law school
personnel.90
The DOJ determined that the application of certain ABA law school
accreditation standards “unreasonably restricted competition in the market
for the services of professional law school personnel.”91 The Consent
Decree was necessary because most of the process “was carried out by the
Accreditation Committee and the Consultant’s office and was kept from
public view and the supervision of the ABA’s Board of Governor’s and
House of Delegates.”92 The DOJ felt that “reform of the entire accreditation
process was needed.”93 The Consent Decree “provisions were designed to
address allegations that the ABA had allowed the accreditation process to
be misused by law school personnel with a direct interest in its outcome.”94
The Consent Decree required, inter alia, that the Council revise its
membership so that, in part, no more than fifty percent of the members
consist of law school deans or faculty.95
C. The Department of Education’s Review of the ABA and the DOJ
Modified Consent Decree
In 1992, Congress amended the Higher Education Act to require that
a DOE-recognized accrediting agency be “separate and independent” from
an affiliated trade association.96 In 1994, the DOE promulgated
implementing regulations.97 After conducting an investigation of the ABA,
the DOE determined that the ABA was not in compliance with federal law
and was not entitled to a waiver.98 A waiver may not be granted if the trade
16 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1
supra note 1.
99. See 34 C.F.R. § 602.14(d) (2001); see also United States’ Response to Public
Comments About Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 1.
100. See id.
101. See 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(b)(1) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 602.14(b)(1) (2001). 
102. Id.
103. See 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(b)(2) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 602.14(b)(2) (2001).
104. See Memorandum in Support of the Joint Motion for Modification, supra note 94,
at 5-6.
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id. (citation omitted).
107. See id. (citation omitted).
108. See id.
109. Id. at 5-6.
110. Id. at 6.
111. United States v. ABA, No. 95-1211, 2001 WL 514376, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 16,
association plays any role in the “making or ratifying” of accreditation
decisions, or engages in sharing of the accrediting agency’s non-public
information, both of which the ABA did.99 The ABA was not entitled to a
waiver based on the House’s role in approving accreditation policies,
making final accrediting decisions, and hearing appeals, and on the sharing
of non-public accrediting information between the Council and the ABA’s
governing board.100 An affiliated trade association may not make final
accreditation policies or decisions.101 The body that makes such decisions
may not be elected or selected by the Board or Chief Executive Officer of
the related trade association.102 Furthermore, one-seventh of the accrediting
agency’s decision-making body must be comprised of members of the
general public, not members of the trade association.103 
The DOE recommended that either the Council be the final decision-
making authority, or the composition of the House be changed.104 The DOE
informed the ABA that an affiliated trade association may not make final
accreditation policies or decisions.105 The body that makes the accreditation
decisions may not be elected or selected by the board or Chief Executive
Officer of the related trade association.106 One-seventh of the accrediting
agency’s decision-making body must be comprised of members of the
general public, not members of the trade association.107 The House has no
public, non-law degreed members.108 The DOE recommended to the ABA
that either the Council must be the final decision-making authority, or that
the composition of the House be changed.109 The ABA made the Council
the final decision-making authority.110
The DOJ consented to the DOE’s recommended modification to the
Consent Decree.111 The district court’s only consideration regarding the
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2001).
112. Id. See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(citation omitted); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1460 ( D.C. Cir.
1995) (explaining that the court’s function in reviewing agreed-upon decree modification
is “not to determine whether the resulting array of rights and resulting liabilities ‘is the one
that will best serve society,’ but only to confirm that the resulting settlement is ‘within the
reaches of the public interest.’”).
113. Memorandum in Support of the Joint Motion for Modification, supra note 94, at
8-9 (emphasis added).
114. Id.; see also ABA, 2001 WL 514376 at *1.
115. Memorandum in Support of the Joint Motion for Modification, supra note 94, at
9 (emphasis added).
Consent Decree was limited to determining whether the proposed
modification was within the “zone of settlements.”112 In the United States’
Memorandum in Support of the Joint Motion for Modification of the Final
Judgment, the DOJ and the ABA, in response to the DOE, 
agreed to modify the Final Judgment to specifically provide for the
House of Delegates to have a House of Lords advisory role in
accrediting individual law schools. At the time the Final Judgment
was entered, the House of Delegates had been the final decision-
maker on accrediting individual law schools for more than half a
century, and, therefore, the Justice Department did not need to
seek relief on this issue. Because the DOE has now determined that
the House may not make these decisions, the parties have agreed
to add this provision to mandate the House of Lords oversight role
that DOE has approved. Moreover, adding this provision to the
Final Judgment will prevent further dilution of the role of the
House of Delegates without the Court’s permission.113
The DOJ and ABA agreed to modify section VI(A) of the Final
Judgment,114 which now states, in pertinent part:
that following notification by the Council of the Council’s action
to adopt or amend any Standard, Interpretation, or Rule, the House
of Delegates shall vote either to agree with the Council’s action, or
refer it back to the Council for consideration based on reasons
specified by the House, provided that the House shall be limited to
referring an action back to the Council a maximum of two times,
and that the decision of the Council will be final following its
consideration of the last permitted referral.115 
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116. See ABA, 2001 WL 514376 at *1.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. See Legal Educ. Bylaws, supra note 52, art. IV(b).
121. See id. at art. X.
122. Rule 6(b), supra note 54.
Section VI(M) was added to the Final Judgment,116 now requiring that the
ABA
permit appeals to the House of Delegates from a Council decision
granting or denying provisional or full approval to a law school, or
withdrawing, suspending or terminating approval of a law school.
The House shall vote either to agree with the Council’s action or
to refer it back to the Council for a reconsideration based on the
reasons specified by the House. An action granting or denying
provisional or full approval may be referred back to the Council a
maximum of two times. An action withdrawing, suspending or
terminating approval may be referred back to the Council one time.
The decision of the Council will be final following its
consideration of the last permitted referral.117
Section VI(A) of the Consent Decree now states that “the House shall
be limited to referring an action back to the Council a maximum of two
times, and that the decision of the Council will be final following its
consideration of the last permitted referral.”118 Section VI(M) of the
Consent Decree now reads: “The decision of the Council will be final
following its consideration of the last permitted referral.”119 While the
approval of the Consent Decree was pending, the House amended Article
IV of the Council’s Bylaws to divest oversight by the House or the
governing board of the Accreditation of Law Schools Project budget so that
it is no longer “subject to review or consultation by the Board of Governors
or any other entity outside the Section.”120 Article X of the Bylaws now
states that actions taken by the Council regarding accreditation are effective
after review, rather than approval, by the House.121 Rules 6 and 10 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Approval of Law Schools now states that both
the House and the Board are divested of final decision-making authority
over the Council’s accreditation decisions.122
Tom Leahy, a past president of the Illinois State Bar Association and
member of the House, filed a public objection to the proposed modification,
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123. See United States’ Response to Public Comments About Proposed Modification
of Final Judgment, supra note 1, at 26. The DOJ also acknowledged arguments presented
by Professor Gary Palm, a former member of the Council, and Professor John Elson, a
former member of the Accreditation Committee who participated in numerous site visits.
However, the DOJ was unconcerned about whether the structural change being pursued by
the ABA was otherwise prohibited.
In addition to these arguments, Professors Elson and Palm argued that the ABA
violated its constitution in adopting the provision giving the House of Delegates
review and remand authority rather than final decision-making authority. They
argue that the ABA’s constitution requires the House to supervise the Section on
Legal Education. Whether the ABA followed its own rules in adopting the change
is immaterial to the issue before the Court. The only issue before the Court is
whether the modification proposed is in the public interest, not whether the ABA
procedures to implement the modification violate its own procedures.
Id. at 26 n.24. It appears the DOJ put on blinders and focused only on whether the Consent
Decree could be modified like any other consent decree, not whether the path toward
modification was otherwise barred by the organizational structure of the ABA via the ABA
Constitution and Illinois law.
124. See United States v. ABA, 2001 WL514376 at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2001).
125. See Letter from Sebert, supra note 19, at 3.
126. The Illinois Not For Profit Act, under which the ABA is incorporated provides that
only the governing board and committees (whose membership consists of a majority of the
governing board) may act to bind the corporation. All other entities act only in an advisory
capacity to the corporation. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.40 (West 1993).
However, federal law regarding professional accrediting associations requires that the
accrediting body be “separate and independent” of the association. See 34 C.F.R.
stating that if the House no longer had authority over the Council, the
Council could make independent decisions and not be swayed at all by the
corporation.123 Notwithstanding, the modified Consent Decree was
approved on February 16, 2001.124 The very next day, February 17, 2001,
the Counsel reversed the Accreditation Committee’s favorable
recommendation to approve Barry.125 
III. THE ABA’S DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO AN ADVISORY BODY TO
RENDER LAW SCHOOL ACCREDITATION DECISIONS WHICH BIND THE
CORPORATION IS AN ULTRA VIRES ACT
When the House confirmed the Board’s decision to vest binding
authority in the Council with regard to accreditation and budgetary matters,
the ABA acted ultra vires. This ultra vires act is null and void. The ABA
has essentially two choices. The ABA must either (1) forgo DOE
accreditation, or (2) create a completely separate corporation, having a
separate corporate identity from the ABA. Under its present structure, if the
ABA abides by state law, it violates federal law.126 If the ABA abides by
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§ 602.14(a), (b) (2003). Since a majority of the Council is not composed of members of the
House, the Council must function under Illinois law in merely an advisory capacity. On the
other hand, in order to maintain its accrediting role, federal law requires the Council to act
“separate and independent” from the corporation. These two roles cannot be reconciled. See
infra note 212.
127. See Elson, supra note 4, at 283.
128. If the ABA forgoes DOE accreditation, the state supreme courts could still look
to the ABA for accreditation decisions. Independent law schools not affiliated with a
regionally accredited university would be unable to offer federally funded student loans.
These law schools would have to seek accreditation from some other DOE approved regional
accrediting organization.
129. See About the Section, Accreditation, Bar Admissions, available at
http://www.abanet.org (accessed from homepage by selecting Law Student Resources, Legal
Education, About the Section, Accreditation, then Bar Admissions) (last visited May 19,
2003).
130. See National Institutional and Specialized Accreditation Bodies, available at
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OPE (accessed from homepage by selecting Accreditation, Lists
of Nationally Recognized Accrediting Agencies, then Law (last visited Mar. 7, 2003); see
also 34 C.F.R. § 602 (2003).
131. See United States’ Response to Public Comments About Proposed Modifications
of Final Judgment, supra note 1.
132. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.05(a) (West 1993). 
federal law, it violates state law and the ABA Constitution.127 At a
minimum, the ABA must abide by state law. The ABA must either
relinquish DOE accreditation or it must restructure and spin off a separate
corporation. There are no other options.128
A fundamental and central object of the ABA is the accreditation of
law schools. The first section created by the ABA in 1893 was the Section
of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar.129 Presently, the ABA is the
only law school accrediting agency recognized by the DOE.130 Since the
Council of the Section began accrediting law schools in 1921, the
governing body of the ABA, vested in the House, has always had absolute
veto power over accreditation decisions and budget.131 Only recently did the
ABA change this procedure. This change was done to satisfy the DOE. In
doing so, the ABA violated Illinois law. 
A. The ABA’s Delegation of Binding, Non-Reviewable Authority over Law
School Accreditation Matters to an Advisory Body Is an Ultra Vires Act
Prohibited by Illinois Law
The Illinois Not For Profit Act requires that the affairs of the
corporation “be managed by or under the direction of the board of
directors.”132 The governing board may also appoint a committee authorized
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133. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.40(a) (West 1993).
134. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.40(d) (West 1993). 
135. See Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint ¶¶ 83, 85, 86, 88, 367, Staver v. ABA, 169 F.
Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Fla. 2001) [hereinafter Complaint]; Defendant’s Answer to Amended
Complaint ¶¶ 83, 85, 86, 88, Staver v. ABA, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Fla. 2001),
available at http://www.lc.org (accessed from homepage by selecting ABA Accreditation
Research then Amended Complaint) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
136. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.05(a), .40(a)-(d) (West 1993). The ABA
Constitution addresses the sections under Article 30, whereas committees are addressed
under Article 31. See ABA CONST., supra note 36, arts. 30-31. ABA representative Marina
Jacks has acknowledged that which is evident in the ABA Constitution: that the sections are
not committees. See Declaration of Marina Jacks ¶ 18, Staver v. ABA, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1372
(M.D. Fla. 2001), available at http://www.lc.org (accessed from homepage by selecting
ABA Research then Amended Complaint) (last visited Mar. 14, 2003). Moreover, mere
nomenclature does not make a department of a corporation a committee. Even the entities
within the ABA which the ABA terms “committees” are not committees according the
definition of a committee under Illinois law. At a minimum, a committee under Illinois law
must be composed of at least fifty-one percent of the governing board. A duly constituted
committee under Illinois law must be appointed by and composed of a majority of the
governing board. See ILL. COMP STAT. ANN 105/108.40(a); ABA CONST., supra note 36,
arts. 30-32.
137. Declaration of Darryl DePriest ¶ 5, Staver v. ABA, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D.
Fla. 2001), available at http://www.lc.org (accessed from homepage by selecting ABA
Accreditation Research then Declaration of Darryl DePriest) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
138. See ABA Articles of Incorporation, supra note 32.
to bind the corporation to certain acts not otherwise prohibited by statute.133
A majority of the committee’s members must be members of and appointed
by the governing board. Besides the governing board and a committee, all
other entities of a corporation are only advisory, which means that the
governing board must retain power to approve or overrule all decisions
made by such entities.134
A majority of the Council of the Section’s membership does not consist
of members of the House or of the Board, is not appointed by these
governing boards and thus, the Council is not a committee.135 Only the
governing board or a committee properly constituted and appointed by the
governing board may bind the entire corporation.136
The ultra vires action occurred when the ABA divested the governing
board of supervision, direction and control over an advisory body, the
Council. ABA General Counsel, Darryl DePriest, admitted in an affidavit
that in August 1999 the ABA restructured the accreditation process “to give
the Council final decision-making authority concerning accreditation of
individual law schools.”137
On December 7, 1992, the ABA incorporated in the State of Illinois.138
Prior to this time the ABA had never been incorporated anywhere in the
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139. See ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 14.
140. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/101.70.
141. See ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 45, § 45.9; Legal Educ. Bylaws, supra note
52, art. IV; Rules 6, 10, supra note 54.
142. See United States’ Response to Public Comments About Proposed Modifications
of Final Judgment, supra note 1.
143. This structure exists only in relation to law school accreditation decisions and the
budget of the Accreditation of Law Schools Project. Outside of these two areas, the Council
of the Section remains an advisory body in the same way that every other section operates
in an advisory capacity to the House and the Board.
144. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.40(a).
145. See 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(a)(3), (b) (2000).
146. See 34 C.F.R. § 602.3(d), .14(a), (b) (1999); 64 Fed. Reg. 56612, 56618-19 (Oct.
20, 1999).
147. See United States’ Response to Public Comments About Proposed Modifications
of Final Judgment, supra note 1.
148. 34 C.F.R. § 602.14(d) (1999). 
United States.139 When the ABA became a corporate entity in the State of
Illinois where it is headquartered, it became regulated by Illinois corporate
law.140
From its incorporation until August 1999, the ABA House continued
to exercise veto power over the Council’s accreditation decisions as it had
done from its inception. However, in August 1999, for the first time in its
history, the ABA purported to change its structure by allowing the Council
to bind the corporation in all matters pertaining to law school
accreditation.141 This change was undertaken solely to placate the DOE in
meeting the “separate and independent” requirement.142 The House, as the
governing board, literally reversed roles with the Council. Instead of the
Council being advisory to the House, the House became advisory to the
Council.143 This role reversal is precluded by Illinois law and is ultra
vires.144
In 1992, prior to the DOJ’s antitrust action against the ABA, Congress
passed a requirement in the Higher Education Act that required a DOE-
recognized accrediting agency to be “separate and independent” from an
affiliated trade association.145 In 1994, the DOE promulgated regulations
to implement the federal law.146
In 1997, the year following the DOJ Consent Decree, the DOE
determined that the ABA was not in compliance with the Higher Education
Act.147 Under DOE regulations, a trade association may not play any role
in the “making or ratifying” of accreditation decisions, or engage in sharing
of the accrediting agency’s non-public information, both of which the ABA
did.148 The body that makes the accreditation decisions may not be elected
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See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
154. Memorandum in Support of the Joint Motion for Modification, supra note 94.
155. Id. 
or selected by the Board or Chief Executive Officer of the related trade
association.149 Furthermore, one-seventh of the accrediting agency’s
decision-making body must be members of the general public, not members
of the trade association.150 
The DOE recommended that either the Council of the Section be the
final decision-making authority, or the composition of the House be
changed.151 The ABA decided to make the Council the final decision-
making authority.152 The DOJ consented to the DOE’s recommended
modification to the Consent Decree.153 In response to the DOE, the DOJ
and the ABA
agreed to modify the Final Judgment to specifically provide for the
House of Delegates to have a House of Lords advisory role in
accrediting individual law schools. At the time the Final Judgment
was entered, the House of Delegates had been the final decision-
maker on accrediting individual law schools for more than half a
century, and, therefore, the Justice Department did not need to
seek relief on this issue. Because the DOE has now determined that
the House may not make these decisions, the parties have agreed
to add this provision to mandate the House of Lords oversight role
that the DOE has approved. Moreover, adding this provision to the
Final Judgment will prevent further dilution of the role of the
House of Delegates without the court’s permission.154
The DOJ and ABA agreed to modify section VI(A) of the Consent
Decree to provide that “the House shall be limited to referring an action
back to the Council a maximum of two times, and that the decision of the
Council will be final following its consideration of the last permitted
referral.”155 A further modification to section VI(N) of the Consent Decree
now states: “The decision of the Council will be final following its
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157. See United States v. ABA, 2001 WL 514376 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2001).
158. See Legal Educ. Bylaws, supra note 52, art. IV(1)(b).
159. Legal Educ. Bylaws, supra note 52, art. IV(b). 
160. Id. at art. I(2)(b). 
161. See ABA CONST., supra note 36, art. 45, § 45.9.
162. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.05(a), .40(a) (1993).
163. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.40(a) (1993) (emphasis added).
164. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.40(c)(1)-(7) (1993).
consideration of the last permitted referral.” 156
The modified Consent Decree was approved on February 16, 2001.157
While the approval of the Consent Decree was pending, the House
amended Article IV of the Section’s Bylaws to divest oversight by the
House and the Board over the Accreditation of Law Schools Project
budget.158 The Council’s decisions concerning the accreditation budget are
no longer “subject to review or consultation by the Board of Governors or
any other entity outside the Section.”159 Article X of the Bylaws was
amended to give the Council final authority in accreditation decisions.160
Rules 6 and 10 and Article 45.9 of the ABA Rules of Procedure of the
House of Delegates state that both the House and the Board are divested of
final decision-making authority over the Council’s accreditation
decisions.161
Under Illinois law there are only two entities within a corporation than
can bind the entire corporation—the governing board and committees.162 A
committee is more than mere nomenclature; it must be constituted pursuant
to Illinois law. The relevant statute states the following:
If the articles of incorporation or bylaws so provide, a majority of
the directors may create one or more committees and appoint
directors or such other persons as the board designates, to serve on
the committee or committees. Each committee shall have two or
more directors, a majority of its membership shall be directors,
and all committee members shall serve at the pleasure of the
board.163
If so constituted, a committee “may exercise the authority of the board
of directors,” except a committee may not bind the corporation to seven
specified categories.164 Pursuant to Illinois law, the governing board
may create and appoint persons to a commission, advisory body or
other such body which may or may not have directors as members,
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168. See, e.g., Massachusetts Sch. of Law at Andover v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir.
1997).
169. The ABA could separately incorporate the Council. To maintain compliance with
the DOE, the governing board of a separately incorporated Council could not be elected or
appointed by the governing board of the ABA. Obviously, the ABA would lose a significant
amount of control over a separately incorporated council. Such a move would weaken, but
not eliminate, the ABA’s control over accreditation. On the other hand, if the ABA wanted
to retain control over accreditation and continue its current structure, it could choose to
forgo approval by the DOE. If the ABA were not approved by the DOE because of non-
compliance with the Higher Education Act, the state supreme courts may still rely on the
ABA for accreditation. The only benefit DOE approval brings to an accrediting body is that
schools accredited by such an entity may offer federally guaranteed student loans. Law
schools may still offer federal student loans if they are separately accredited by regional
accrediting agencies. Only a few have not sought separate accreditation. 
which body may not act on behalf of the corporation or bind it to
any action but may make recommendations to the board of
directors or to the officers.165
According to Illinois law, a corporation’s “bylaws may contain any
provision for the regulation and management of the affairs of a corporation
not inconsistent with law or the articles of incorporation.”166 If the ABA’s
Bylaws violate the statute, the articles or the ABA Constitution, then the
Bylaws are ultra vires. The ABA’s amendments to Articles IV and X of the
Section Bylaws, to Article 45.9 of the ABA Rules of Procedure of the
House of Delegates, and Rules 6 and 10 of the Rules of Procedure for
Approval of Law Schools violate both the Illinois Not For Profit statute and
Article 6.1 of the ABA Constitution.167
Accreditation is a major function of the ABA. The first section created
by the ABA in 1893 was the Section of Legal Education and Admissions
to the Bar. In 1921, the ABA began accrediting law schools.168 From its
inception, the governing body of the ABA, vested in the House, has
exercised veto power over the Council’s decision on accreditation. Only
recently did the ABA divest the House of authority over the Council. This
action violates the Illinois Not For Profit Act. The ABA could comply with
state law, the ABA Constitution and the Higher Education Act if it chose
to do so.169
26 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1
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172. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/103.15(a) (1993); see also Sawko v. Dominion
Plaza One Condo. Ass’n No. 1-A, 578 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that
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action as ultra vires). Members of the ABA have standing to challenge ultra vires acts of the
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gives the corporation life, but also includes violation of internal governing documents such
as the Constitution, Bylaws and Rules. See, e.g., Perkaus v. Chi. Catholic High Sch. Athletic
League, 488 N.E.2d 623, 627 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); see also Wolinsky v. Kadison, 449
N.E.2d 151, 155-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). Under Illinois law, “the constitution and bylaws
of an unincorporated association [including a corporation] constitute a contract between the
association and the members.” Perkaus, 488 N.E.2d at 627; see also Austin v. Am. Ass’n
of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 968 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Ordinarily a dispute between
a voluntary association and one of its members is governed by the law of contracts, the
parties’ contractual obligations being defined by the charter. . . .”); Wolinsky, 449 N.E.2d
at 155-56 (holding that a condominium association owes a fiduciary duty to members of the
association and violation of condominium declaration or bylaws constitutes a breach of said
duty); St. Francis Courts Condo. Assoc. v. Investors Real Estate, 432 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982) (holding an attempted amendment to condominium declaration void for
failure to follow condominium act and condominium declaration); Bramson v. Beau Monde,
Inc., 415 So.2d 761, 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that failure of board of directors
to comply with condominium declaration was ultra vires and action was void).
173. 139 U.S. 24 (1891).
The United States Supreme Court stated long ago that “corporations
created by statute must depend, both for their powers, and the mode of
exercising them, upon the true construction of the statute itself.”170 A
corporation is a creature of the legislature to which it “owes its existence”
and from which it must “derive all its powers,” and thus it may act “only in
the manner which that act authorizes.”171
Under Illinois law, members of a corporation entitled to vote may
institute a proceeding in court “to enjoin the doing of any act or acts” of a
corporation which are claimed to be ultra vires.172 An Illinois corporation
has only those powers authorized by statute and within its constitution, so
long as it is consistent with the authorizing statute. One Illinois court
observed the following:
A corporation has no natural rights or capacities, such as an
individual or an ordinary partnership, and if a power is claimed for
it, the words giving the power or from which it is necessarily
implied must be found in the charter or it does not exist. The law
on this subject is stated by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Palace Car Co.,173 as
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178. Id. at 877.
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follows: “The charter of a corporation, read in the light of any
general laws which are applicable, is the measure of its powers,
and the enumeration of those powers implies the exclusion of all
others not fairly incidental.”174
In Wallace v. Madden,175 the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed a
decision on a Catholic Order of Foresters, a fraternal beneficiary society,
and stated the following: 
When the order adopted its constitution and by-laws, and became
organized under the statute, it became subject to all the provisions
of the statute. It became clothed with such power, and such only,
as was conferred by the statute; and any provision of its
constitution or by-laws inconsistent with the statute or not
authorized by the statute, would be a nullity.176
In Illinois, the rule of construction applicable to statutory provisions is
“that every power that is not clearly granted is withheld, and that any
ambiguity in the terms of the grants must operate against the corporations
and in favor of the public.” If the power claimed is withheld, “it is regarded
as a prohibition against the exercise of such a power.”177 “Corporations can
only exercise such powers as may be conferred by the legislative bodies
creating them. . . .”178 The Illinois Supreme Court further said:
Where a corporation is formed under the general law, the law itself,
and not the declaration of incorporation, or the constitution and
bylaws adopted for the corporate government, becomes the charter,
and enumerates the powers which are to be exercised. The charter
of a corporation formed under such general law does not consist of
the articles of incorporation alone, but of said articles taken in
connection with the law under which the organization takes
place.179
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181. Id. at 1210. Whether accreditation is a central function of the ABA need not be
resolved to conclude that the ABA has acted ultra vires under the Illinois Not for Profit Act
and Article 6.1 of the ABA Constitution. The central function of a corporation need only be
resolved if the corporate statute or the constitution are silent on particular functions. Here,
the Illinois statute and Article 6.1 are crystal clear. Only a corporate governing board or a
duly constituted committee may bind the corporation, and the House, as the governing
board, must “direct” and “supervise” the Section.
182. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries,
381 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (D.D.C. 1974).
183. See Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Int’l Marathons, Inc., 467 N.E.2d 58, 63 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1984).
184. Id. at 63-64 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
185. See id. at 62.
186. See Stoneman v. Fox Film Corp., 4 N.E.2d 63, 66 (Mass. 1936) (holding that
The laws of other jurisdictions comport with the well-settled law in
Illinois. In Chapin v. Benwood Foundation, Inc.,180 the court stated that
directors of a “corporation may not delegate to others those duties which
lay at the heart of the management of the corporation.”181 In a case
involving investments by a corporation, a federal court found that “[t]otal
abdication of the supervisory role . . . is improper even under traditional
corporate principles.”182 The governing board may not delegate power to
enter into a contract which totally encumbers the most significant aspect of
the corporation.183 Regarding the nonprofit Boston Athletic Association, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court stated the following:
Principles of corporate governance with respect to the power of the
board of governors to delegate authority to individual officers are
applicable to profit and nonprofit corporations alike. In fact, the
powers of an officer of a charitable corporation to bind the
corporation without specific ratification by the board of governors
or directors are more strictly construed than would be similar
powers of an officer of a business corporation. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . The rule on delegation of authority to officers of charitable
or nonprofit organizations is the result of heightened public interest
in the affairs of those organizations.184
An essential function of the Boston Athletic Association was a local
marathon, and that function could not be delegated outside of the direct
supervision of the board.185 Most assuredly, the ABA may not delegate the
function of law school accreditation.186 “Too broad a delegation of powers,
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190. 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1507 (1985).
191. 2 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 495 (1998) [hereinafter
FLETCHER].
192. See 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2009 (1985). 
either expressed or implied, may be interpreted as an unlawful abdication
by the board of directors of its management functions.”187 The ABA has
abdicated the responsibility of supervising and controlling the Counsel. The
ABA’s abdication of oversight is both “formal” and “effective.”
Formal abdication occurs when directors are fully and unalterably
deprived of the ability to make a decision that they are required to
make. Effective abdication may occur when directors retain
authority to make the decision but, in reality, the outcome is
predetermined.188
The current “appeal” procedure from the Council to the House is no
appeal at all; it is illusory. The House has no authority to overrule the
Council. The House may only “refer” back to the Council, but the Council
has the final word.189 Indeed, the “outcome is predetermined.” The Council
has been cut free from the ABA governing body, yet it remains part of the
ABA. The Council is not separately incorporated. It is not a committee.
Nonetheless, the Council exercises enormous autonomy and authority to
bind the ABA on issues central to the corporation, namely accreditation.
This structure violates Illinois law and is ultra vires.
Traditional corporate law has long established that directors may not
“delegate the responsibility to govern the corporation unless permitted to
do so by statute.”190 Moreover, “directors of the corporation do not have the
power to delegate to others those duties which are at the focal point of the
management of the corporation.”191 When a corporation acts outside of an
authorizing statute, it is considered to have acted ultra vires, which is
beyond the power of the corporation.192 “[A] board of directors has no
power to delegate the performance of its basic powers and functions,
particularly its statutory prerogatives, in the absence of express statutory
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authority.”193 The powers of a nonprofit corporation’s board to delegate (or
in this case, to abdicate) authority to a subordinate entity is more
circumscribed than for profit corporations.194 “The board of directors
cannot delegate to subordinate officers or agents the exercise of
discretionary powers which by the articles of incorporation, general laws,
bylaws, or vote [of the members or shareholders] is vested exclusively in
the board.”195
An ultra vires act is one undertaken without authority. The action of the
ABA to vest binding authority in what the Illinois statute considers an
advisory body is ultra vires, and such act is void ab initio.
An ultra vires act or contract is one that is beyond the powers
expressly or impliedly conferred upon a corporation. The act must
be beyond the powers of a corporation as defined by its charter and
the law. So long as an act is beyond a corporation’s power as so
defined, it is ultra vires. . . . If the act sought to be done is foreign
to the nature and design of the corporation, it is ultra vires;
furthermore, although the act is calculated to attain a permissible
corporate purpose, it may be ultra vires because of the undue
means of accomplishing it. . . . [C]orporate acts are also said to be
ultra vires where the corporation is not authorized to perform such
acts because of a disregard of certain formalities which the law
demands, because of an improper use of enumerated powers, or
because of a lack of power in such regard in its officers or
agents.196
The statutory prohibition against vesting an advisory board with
authority to bind the corporation is clear. The ABA vested the Council with
such authority. This act is ultra vires.
B. The ABA’s Delegation of Binding, Non-Reviewable Authority over Law
School Accreditation Matters to an Advisory Body Is an Ultra Vires Act
Prohibited by Article 6.1 of the ABA Constitution
Vesting the Council with authority to bind the ABA is not only
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prohibited by Illinois law, it is prohibited by the ABA’s constitution.
Article 6.1 of the ABA Constitution states that “The House of Delegates
shall . . . supervise and direct the . . . sections . . . .”197 Professor John Elson,
former member of the ABA Accreditation Committee, has written that the
divestiture of “the ABA House of Delegates of any decision making
authority over accreditation matters, [is] contrary to the ABA’s own
constitution.”198
Interpreting the word “supervise” as utilized in another Illinois statute,
an Illinois court of appeals pointed to the definition in Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary, which defined “supervise” as follows:
[T]o coordinate, direct, and inspect continuously and at first hand
the accomplishment of: oversee with the powers of direction and
decision the implementation of one’s own or another’s
intentions.199
The same court also pointed to the Oxford English Dictionary, which
defines “supervision” as “[g]eneral management, direction, or control;
oversight, superintendence.”200 The court noted that the same dictionary
defined the word “direct” in the following manner: “[k]eep in right order;
to regulate, control, govern the actions of . . . [t]o cause (a thing or person)
to move . . . toward a place.”201 The court also noted that “supervision often
involves some active participation.”202 Indeed, “supervision extends beyond
passive oversight of an activity and includes direction . . . and—to some
degree—active participation in an activity while supervising it.”203
Article 6.1 of the ABA Constitution requires the House to “direct” and
“supervise” the Section. That is, the House must “inspect continuously,”
“oversee with the powers of direction and decision,” “control,” “govern the
actions of,” and “actively participate” in the Council’s decisions regarding
accreditation of law schools. The House must do more than merely engage
in “passive oversight” of the Council’s decisions on law school
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ABA approved law schools. During the DOE hearing in 1998, the governing board of the
ALDA consisted of Robert Scott of the University of Virginia, Judith Areen of Georgetown
University, Douglas Baird of the University of Chicago, Paul Breast of Stanford University,
Ron Case of Boston University, Colin Diver of the University of Pennsylvania, Pamela
Brooks-Gann of Duke University, James Hoffman of Lewis and Clark University, Jeffrey
Lehman of the University of Michigan and Harvey Perlman of the University of Nebraska.
accreditation.
Article 6.1 has never been amended and itself prohibits the Council
from acting independently. The House must actively “supervise” and
“direct” the Council as it did prior to August 1999. Under its present
structure an aggrieved law school can only hope for a remand to the same
body that denied the school in the first place. That is not an appeal, nor is
it supervision or direction. The House remand is without power, is not
capable of reversal, and obligates the Council to do nothing. This process
violates Illinois law and the ABA’s constitution under Article 6.1. 
The argument that the ABA’s current structure violates its own
constitution is not unprecedented. On June 8, 1998, ABA General Counsel
Darryl DePriest testified before the DOE’s National Advisory Committee
on Institutional Quality and Integrity regarding the ABA’s compliance (or
lack thereof) with the Higher Education Act. Mr. DePriest acknowledged
that to divest the House of control, the ABA must amend its constitution.
He stated the following:
[T]he Board of Governors can act between meetings of the House,
the Board of Governors, though, cannot amend the constitution and
bylaws of the Association. If that were to be the solution to this
problem [of the Council being “separate and independent” from the
trade association], to amend the constitution and bylaws, it would
have to be done by the House. . . . Let us just say, for example, the
role that the House of Delegates plays in the accreditation process
is captured within our constitution and bylaws. So that, if, for
example, in order to comply with separate and independent, we
wanted to excise the role of the House from the process, that would
require an amendment to our constitution and bylaws.204
Also testifying at the same DOE meeting in 1998 was Scott Bice, who
at the time was dean of the University of Southern California Law School
and president of the American Law Deans Association (ALDA).205 He
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stated the following:
[T]here are significant problems for the ABA to overcome in
meeting the separate and independent criterion. Under the current
process, the ABA Board of Governors and its House of Delegates
have virtually plenary power over the Council. State delegations
can and have proposed accreditation standards directly to the
House of Delegates without consent of the Council.
The House of Delegates has the power to adopt those standards
over the objection of the Council. The Council is, in effect, a mere
department of a voluntary trade association, and there will have
to be significant changes in the ABA Constitution to give
independence to the Council if it is to continue as a federally
approved accrediting agency.206
The ABA acknowledged before the DOE that if the ABA were required
to isolate the Council’s accreditation decisions from the House, it would
have to amend its constitution.207 Putting aside for the moment the statutory
prohibition to the current ABA structure, Article 6.1 would have to be
amended so that the House is no longer required to “direct” and “supervise”
the Council of the Section. The ABA has never amended Article 6.1. An
amendment to the constitution requires an affirmative vote of two-thirds of
the members of the House.208 An amendment to the Bylaws requires only
a simple majority.209 
One would expect a league of attorneys would abide by the law and
respect the rights of its members. Unfortunately, the ABA has a checkered
history of flouting the law. In the area of accreditation, the ABA has
violated antitrust law, and has become subject to a ten-year Consent Decree
to refrain from antitrust activities. The ABA violated the federal Higher
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Education Act (HEA). When the DOE inquired of the ABA regarding its
compliance with the Higher Education Act, the ABA stated that the
accreditation process and structure complied the law.210 Obviously, the
ABA was not in compliance with the Higher Education Act, and thus the
reason for the modified Consent Decree. The ABA is currently violating
Illinois law under which it is incorporated. The ABA is also presently
violating its own constitution. Despite the fact that the ABA told the DOE
it would have to amend its constitution in order to make the Council
“separate and independent,” it has failed to do so. 
Even if the ABA did amend Article 6.1 of the ABA Constitution to
allow the Council to act autonomously of the House, such action would still
violate Illinois law. An Illinois non-profit corporation must act in
accordance with the state corporate statute and in accordance with its own
constitution. A corporate constitution may not grant authority to a nonprofit
corporation which is prohibited by the corporate statute. For example, if the
state statute prohibits a nonprofit corporation from issuing shares, the
corporate constitution may not authorize the issuance of shares. Similarly,
if the state law prohibits officers and directors of a nonprofit corporation
from receiving dividends, the corporate constitution may not authorize the
payments of dividends. Thus, even if Article 6.1 of the ABA Constitution
were amended to authorize the Council to bind the corporation to
accreditation decisions over which the House has no veto, such act would
be ultra vires because Illinois law prohibits an advisory body from binding
the corporation.211 
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212. This point should not be overlooked. The Council not only makes decisions
regarding new applications for provisional accreditation, it also reviews accredited schools
for continued accreditation. Moreover, the Council, not the House, creates the Standards
which govern accreditation. One would think that the governing body of the corporation
would by necessity exercise veto power over a department of the corporation, especially
when that same department has faced investigations by both the DOJ and the DOE. If the
Consent Decree is breached at any time during the effective period, such breach by its very
terms subjects the ABA to contempt of court. See United States v. ABA, 934 F. Supp. 435,
439 (D.D.C. 1996). After the Arthur Anderson accounting fiasco, corporate America
assumed that the corporation would exercise more, rather than less, oversight of the business
activities. Similarly, one would assume that the ABA governing board would seek to
exercise more supervision over the accreditation process, rather than less, following the DOJ
Consent Decree. In fact, the DOJ Consent Decree was originally designed to open up the
process because the Council had concealed much of its activities from the House. Proposed
Final Judgment, 60 Fed. Reg. at 39,426 (“Most of the process, as it applied to individual law
schools, was carried out by the Accreditation Committee and the Consultant’s office and was
kept from public view and the supervision of the ABA’s Board of Governors and House of
Delegates.”). The purpose of the DOJ Consent Decree was essentially gutted by the modified
Consent Decree, which gave way to the DOE’s request to isolate the Council from the
House. See United States v. ABA, 2001 WL 514376 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2001). The reason for
this request is understandable. By their very nature, trade associations that engage in
accreditation or standard-setting have a tendency to act in a self-interested, and thus, anti-
competitive manner. However, the current structure isolates the Council to such an extent
that self-interest and anti-competitive activity is an inherent byproduct. Whatever structure
the ABA takes in the future, the current structure in not in the best interest of ABA members,
law schools or the legal profession.
The problem with the current structure is that the Council of the
Section is completely isolated from the ABA governing board, from the
ABA members and from the public. ABA members have been
disenfranchised from the accreditation process. Under the current structure,
ABA members may no longer object to arbitrary and potentially illegal
decisions of the Council, not even when they are directly injured by the
Council’s actions. Incredibly, not even the House, which is the governing
body of the ABA, can overrule the Council’s decision regarding
accreditation.212 The governing board sits on the sidelines as the Council
renders final decisions regarding accreditation. The Council’s actions are
immune.
When the DOJ filed the antitrust action in 1995, the ABA faced
potential civil and/or criminal liability for engaging in anti-competitive
activity. Antitrust activities and arbitrary accreditation decisions jeopardize
not only the ABA, but also work to the detriment of the membership and
the legal services market. The members must retain their voice to ensure
that the ABA and law school accreditation does not go up in smoke. 
The Council of the Section must be responsive to the full membership
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213. DOE Transcript, supra note 204, at 102-03.
of the ABA, not to just a small guild of legal educators intent on promoting
their own self interests. It makes no sense to allow an advisory body to
enjoy the benefits of legal liability protection behind a corporate veil, and
yet allow the advisory body to violate the same law under which it claims
protection. The law of the state of incorporation grants certain benefits to
corporations and imposes responsibilities. The ABA is incorporated under
the laws of Illinois and it must respect these laws. The ABA has chosen to
become a law unto itself. It flouts state law and thumbs its nose at its
members by acting contrary to the Illinois Not For Profit Act and its own
constitution.
The Council of the Section has historically proven that it has not acted
in the best interest of law schools or its members. Dean Bice, while
president of the American Law School Deans Association, expressed his
concern with the Council:
[M]any of the standards [for law school accreditation] are
inappropriate. Some entrench status and compensation for
particular classes of faculty and administrators. Some impose
educational programs that are not essential to providing an
adequate legal education, and others micromanage law school
administration in indefensible detail.
As the chairperson of the Council himself has stated, the
standards currently reflect “political compromise” responding to a
range of special interests, including librarians, clinical teachers,
and practicing lawyers. We believe the standards should be
sanitized of these political compromises and set only criteria that
are directly related to ensuring that an institution provides adequate
legal education to its students.213
The current structure of the ABA is ultra vires in violation of state law
and the ABA Constitution. In the interest of the legal profession, the ABA
accreditation process must be reformed.
IV. THE ABA’S FLAWED ACCREDITATION PROCESS EXPOSED BY ITS
HANDLING OF BARRY UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
After an eighteen month investigation which began in 1994, the DOJ
concluded that it would be able to prove at trial that the ABA engaged in
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214. See Proposed Final Judgment, 60 Fed. Reg. at 39,426.
215. See Portinga, supra note 1, at 637.
216. Tom Stabile, ABA Still in Charge, NAT’L JURIST 15 (Apr. 2001).
217. Id. 
218. Id. The ABA’s Section on Legal Education has resisted changes to legal education
that would give students more skills training while providing legal services to the poor,
because of a desire “to control the academic content of the law school curriculum.” Arline
Jolles Lotman, Pro Bono and the Challenge of Mandatory Skills Training, 24 PA. LAW. 36,
37 (2002).
219. Stabile, supra note 216.
220. Id.
221. Id.
anti-competitive activity, that it had become a cartel taken over by deans
and law professors who imposed their interests over the educational
interests of the law schools, and that the entire accreditation system needed
complete revision.214 The DOJ was concerned about the unreasonable and
arbitrary rules and implementation thereof by the ABA. The American Law
Deans Association has also castigated the ABA accreditation Standards.215
Former University of Chicago Professor Gary Palm, a six-year veteran
of the Council, wrote to the DOE in 2000, requesting that it revoke the
ABA’s authority to accredit law schools, contending that “the [C]ouncil
and consultant’s actions have not been even-handed and consistent,
showing favoritism and retaliatory motives.”216 He stated that the Council
“makes inconsistent decisions in similar cases. . . . Bar results that are
acceptable for one school are not for another. Schools with ‘friends’ of
powerful members of the Section receive less scrutiny. Schools and
individuals who have challenged the ABA or the Council and its process
are treated adversely.”217 Despite the Consent Decree, the “process is still
controlled by the old group and by academics and dean-friendly groups.”218
In 2000, when John Marshall Law School in Georgia was denied
accreditation, its dean, Robert D’Agostino, stated that there was no
objective evidence for the denial because the school’s bar passage rates
were higher than any other provisionally accredited school. He resigned,
stating that he did not have the political connections to be ABA
accredited.219 In order to determine whether the ABA has ultimately
changed its process since the Consent Decree, D’Agostino says, “[c]ases
to watch are Barry University School of Law in Orlando, Florida where
administrators were shocked in February by the ABA’s decision to reject
the school’s bid for accreditation. . . .”220 “If it turns out the ABA has
judged Barry more harshly than other recently approved schools, . . . critics
will say the old days are back again.”221 Unfortunately, the old days have
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222. Robert E. Oliphant, Will Internet Driven Concord University Law School
Revolutionize Traditional Law School Teaching?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 841, 843
(2000) (stating that “most agree that the status quo was retained” even after the DOJ’s
antitrust lawsuit).
223. Accreditation Committee Report No. 2, supra note 24.
224. See numerous letters written by attorneys and judges to Barry and the ABA which
were filed in as exhibits in Staver v. ABA, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Fla. 2001), available
at http://www.lc.org (accessed from homepage by selecting ABA Accreditation Research,
Complaint Exhibits then Attorney Letters) (last visited May 17, 2003).
225. See Accreditation Committee Report No. 2, supra note 24.
never left.222 As this article will show, the ABA’s handling of Barry
underscores the fundamental flaws in the ABA accreditation process. In
February of 2001, the Council groped for reasons to deny Barry in the face
of a glowing Accreditation Committee Report. The Council focused on
anti-competitive considerations, asking whether Barry could survive in the
central Florida area in view of a newly authorized state school that planned
to begin operations at some indeterminate future date. After the Council
convinced Barry officials to drop its “appeal” to the House in exchange for
a supplemental site visit, the Accreditation Committee issued a report on
November 28, 2001, recommending denial solely on the basis of potential
competition against a law school that had not even accepted its first student
application.223 Competition with other law schools is not a subject for an
accrediting body to consider. These considerations are for the market to
decide.
A. The Council Reverses the Accreditation Committee’s Recommendation
and Denies Accreditation
Those who closely followed the ABA accreditation process involving
Barry were shocked in February of 2001, when the Council reversed a very
favorable Accreditation Committee Report that recommended provisional
accreditation.224 To compound matters, following a supplemental site visit,
the Accreditation Committee later recommended denial in spite of never
once taking issue with the academic program offered by Barry. The sole
reason give for this reversal of opinion was the future presence of a state
supported law school.225
1. The Accreditation Committee’s Report Recommending in Favor of
Provisional Accreditation
The Accreditation Committee met on January 26 through 27, 2001, to
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226. The Barry Site Report (2000) is three times longer than any other report on a new
school considered by the Council over the past several years. Report on Barry University of
Orlando School of Law (Nov. 1, 2000), available at http://www.lc.org (accessed from
homepage by selecting ABA Accreditation Research, Complaint Exhibits, then Barry Site
Report) (last visited May 17, 2003) [hereinafter Barry Site Report of 2000].
Notwithstanding, the Council reviewed the recommendation de novo, rather than giving it
deference under then Rule 5(a). See Report by Diane C. Yu at 2, available at
http://www.lc.org (accessed from homepage by selecting ABA Accreditation Research,
Complaint Exhibits, then Report by Diane C. Yu) (last visited May 17, 2003); see also Rule
5(a), supra note 54. At the time the Council first reviewed Barry in February 2001, Rule 5(a)
provided that favorable Accreditation Committee recommendations were merely to be placed
on the agenda for the Council to review, while unfavorable recommendations under Rule
5(b) were to be reviewed by the Council de novo. Barry’s favorable recommendation should
therefore have been reviewed under Rule 5(a) rather than de novo under Rule 5(b).
Following the subsequent lawsuit against the ABA filed in July 2001, the ABA amended
Rule 5 in August 2002. The current rules eliminate any reference to de novo review by the
Council. Rule 6 now states that the Council shall adopt the Accreditation Committee’s
finding of fact unless the Council determines that the findings of fact are unsupported by
substantial evidence in the record. See Rule 6(b), supra note 54. Moreover, the Council will
not accept new evidence unless (1) the new evidence was not submitted to the Accreditation
Committee; (2) the new evidence could not reasonably have been presented; and (3) a
reference back to the Accreditation Committee to consider the new evidence would present
a serious hardship to the school. See Rule 6(e), supra note 54.
227.  Barry Site Report of 2000, supra note 226, at 38-39 (emphasis added).
228.  See Accreditation Committee Report No. 1 (Jan. 2001), available at http://www
.lc.org (accessed from homepage by selecting ABA Accreditation Research, Complaint
Exhibits, then Accreditation Committee Report) (last visited May 7, 2003).
consider Barry’s application for provisional accreditation.226 The
Committee reviewed the Site Team’s report, which stated:
Barry University and its Law School have proceeded with getting
all the pieces into place for the operation of an institution that will
produce qualified lawyers. There have been marked and
observable changes since the prior site visit in 1999, and the
University has shown good faith in its delivery of support and
encouragement. The law school is maturing.227
On January 27, 2001, the Accreditation Committee recommended
provisional approval of Barry.228 Pursuant to the Standards for Approval of
Law Schools of the American Bar Association, Standard 102(a) states that
“[a] law school is granted provisional approval if it establishes that it is in
substantial compliance with each of the Standards and presents a reliable
plan for bringing the law school into full compliance with the Standards
within three years after receiving provisional approval.” According to
102(a), provisional approval requires only “substantial compliance” rather
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229. See Rule 102(b), supra note 54.
230. See In re Barry Univ. Sch. of Law, 821 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 2002). Also, the pursuit
of an additional law degree, such as an LL.M., is also limited in this situation as most law
schools require graduation from an ABA approved school in order to be admitted to the
LL.M. program.
231. See Letter from Sebert, supra note 19, at 2.
232. Rules, supra note 54.
233. See Rule 5(a), supra note 54.
than “full compliance.” A law school has five years after provisional
approval to obtain full approval.229
Law students graduating from provisionally approved ABA schools in
Florida are eligible to practice law after passing the bar exam, but students
graduating from a Florida law school which does not receive provisional
approval are likely to be barred from practicing law in all fifty states and
territories.230
2. The Council’s Decision Overruling the Accreditation Committee
The Accreditation Committee’s favorable recommendation issued on
January 27, 2001, was heard by the Council a few weeks later on February
17, 2001. Amazingly, the Council reversed the Accreditation Committee’s
favorable recommendation that Barry be accredited.231 In doing so, the
Council violated its own Rules and also raised antitrust concerns.
a. The Council Violated ABA Rules by Using a De Novo Standard
of Review
At the time the Council first reviewed Barry in February 2001, the
Council was required by then Rule 5(a) of the ABA Rules of Procedure for
the approval of Law Schools232 to give substantial deference to a decision
by the Accreditation Committee recommending provisional approval.233
Rule 5 stated:
(a) Accreditation Committee Recommendation to Approve. In
the event that the Accreditation Committee shall determine to
recommend to the Council that provisional or full approval be
granted, the Consultant shall place the Committee recommendation
on the agenda of the meeting.
(b) Accreditation Committee Recommendation to Disapprove.
In the event that Accreditation Committee shall determine not to
recommend to the Council that provisional or full approval be
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234. Rule 5(a)-(b), supra note 54. Following the lawsuit, the ABA amended Rule 5
during its annual meeting held in August 2002. See supra note 226. Former Rule 5 is
available at http://www.lc.org (accessed from homepage by selecting ABA Accreditation
Research then Amended Complaint) at ¶¶ 63-64 (last visited May 7, 2003). Rules 6 and 7
now require the Council to accept the Accreditation Committee’s findings of fact, unless the
Council determines that the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.
235. Report by Diane C. Yu, supra note 226, at 2.
236. See Letter from Sebert, supra note 19, at 2.
237. At the time Standard 302(a)(2) required “at least one rigorous writing experience.”
Standards, supra note 67, at 302(a)(2). Barry not only complied with that Standard but
imposed its own higher standard which required an additional substantial writing
requirement. It is this additional substantial writing requirement to which the Council
referred. See Letter from Sebert, supra note 19, at 3. Since these papers were not required
for ABA accreditation, most were not kept by the School. At any rate, the Barry Site Report
of 1999 praised Barry’s writing program, stating that: 
Barry’s program of legal writing and analysis courses is unusually strong. In
addition to six units of required legal writing and research in the first year,
including a first year moot court experience, several upper division writing and
research elective courses are offered. Advanced Legal Writing is a prerequisite for
all skills courses and clinical placements.
Barry Site Report, ABA Site Evaluation Team 9 (Oct. 1999) (last visited Apr. 15, 2003),
available at http://www.lc.org (accessed from homepage by selecting ABA Accreditation
Research, Complaint Exhibits, then 1999 Site Team Report) [hereinafter Barry Site Report
granted and if the Consultant receives a timely notice of appeal to
the Council from that decision, the Consultant shall place the
school’s appeal on the agenda of a Council meeting. The appeal to
the Council shall constitute a de novo proceeding.234
Rules 5(a)-(b) call for a de novo proceeding only when the Committee
recommends denial of accreditation. The review for an approval is arguably
supposed to be deferential, whereas the review for a denial is de novo. Yet,
Council Chairperson Diane C. Yu stated in a report: “[t]he Council of the
Section of Legal Education Admissions to the Bar considered the Law
School’s application in a de novo proceeding.”235 Despite Rule 5, the
Council engaged in a de novo review and reversed the Accreditation
Committee.236
First, the Council found that:
The School had not established that its educational program
prepares its graduates for admission to the bar [as required under
Standard 301(a)] . . . because (1) examinations vary substantially
in degree of difficulty. . .(2) some student upper-class writing
papers were of average or less-than-average quality . . .237 and (3)
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of 1999].
238. This is inaccurate because the academic support program was implemented in the
fall of 1998. Even the Barry Site Report of 1999 noted that “[t]wo faculty members assist
in the academic support program. Almost all of the students identified as at risk who
participated in the program are in school and appear to be much stronger academically.” See
Barry Site Report of 1999, supra note 237, at 9-10.
239.  See Letter from Sebert, supra note 19, at 3.
240. Barry Site Report of 2000, supra note 226.
241. See id. at 10. The Council expressed concern over “high grades” and noted that
in the spring of 2000, the following grade distribution existed: “12% (A’s), 36.5% (B’s),
46.2% (C’s), 4.5% (D’s), and .6% (F’s).” Id. However, a May 2000 letter from the ABA
Accreditation Committee regarding the William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of
Nevada - Las Vegas, which the Council provisionally accredited in 2000, noted that “of the
1185 grades [given in] (1998-1999), only 35 were C- or lower [2.9%] . . . [and] only 10 were
D [.8%] and only one was F [.08%].” UNLV Report, ABA Accreditation Committee,
Finding 14, at 3 (2001), available at http://www.lc.org (accessed from homepage by
selecting ABA Accreditation Research, Complaint Exhibits, then UNLV Report) (last visited
Feb. 17, 2003) [hereinafter UNLV Report].
242. Letter from Sebert, supra note 19, at 3.
243. The Council Action Letter pointed to Finding 16 of the Accreditation Committee
Report of January 2001 regarding the admissions of four students in 2000 having the
following scores and undergraduate grade point averages: “[1] LSAT of 138 and a UGPA
of 2.39 . . . [2] LSAT of 140 and a UGPA of 2.09 . . . [3] LSAT of 145 and a UGPA of 1.53
. . . [4] LSAT of 139 and a UGPA of 2.47.” Accreditation Committee Report No. 1, supra
note 227, Finding 16, at 4.
244. When searching the 2002 ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW
SCHOOLS, available at http://www.abanet.org (accessed from homepage by selecting Law
the School’s academic support program had only been
implemented in the Fall 2000.238 
Second, the Council pointed to Standard 303(a) and (c) and suggested
that grades were too high, but it ignored the implementation of a new
mandatory curve that requires no more than thirty-three percent of the
grades be awarded at B or above.239 Subsequently, nothing in the Barry Site
Report of 2000240 indicated a lack of application of the academic retention
policies.241
Third, the Council said Barry had not established that it denied
admission to those not capable of completing its educational program.242
The Council could point to only three students who were admitted with
Law School Admission Test (LSAT) scores at or below 140.243 According
to the 2002 edition of the ABA-LSAC Official Guide to ABA Approved Law
Schools (ABA Law School Guide), the LSAT 25th percentile profile of the
fall 2000 entering class shows Barry equal to or higher than that of twelve
fully approved schools.244 Sixty-four of the reporting schools admitted a
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Student/Legal Education and following the links to the Guide) (last visited Apr. 10, 2003)
[hereinafter ABA LAW SCHOOL GUIDE], and entering the LSAT/UGPA combination of 138
and 2.39 into the web-based search system, one may retrieve the names of twenty-two ABA
approved law schools that have full accreditation status, including University of Denver,
Loyola University, Rutgers University, and Stetson University. AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, INC. AND LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, INC., OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA
APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS (2002). A similar search of the resource finds that thirteen fully
approved ABA law schools admitted at least one student in 2000 with LSAT/UGPA of
140/2.09; one fully approved law school admitted a student with an LSAT/UGPA of
145/1.53; and thirty-three schools admitted students with an LSAT/UGPA combination of
139/2.47, including Pepperdine, Widener, Stetson, and Nova Southeastern. Of course, there
are many more schools that could not be added to this list because those schools do not
release their results.
245. See ABA LAW SCHOOL GUIDE, supra note 244, at 253. Three of the four Barry
students in question were minority students. The average LSAT score for Caucasians is 152,
for African-Americans is 142, for Hispanics is 148, and for Puerto Ricans is 140. Law
School Admission Council, LSAT Performance with Regional, Gender, and Ethnic
Breakdowns: 1993-1994 Through 1999-2000 Testing Years (2000). One of the students had
an LSAT score of 138 and a GPA of 2.39. This student was a minority and showed
exceptional leadership and potential for success in graduate school. One student had an
LSAT score of 140 and a GPA of 2.09. Another had an LSAT score of 145 and a GPA of
1.53. This student actually earned a GPA of 2.0 from his degree-granting school, and had
paralegal work experience. The final student had an LSAT of 139, with an overall GPA of
2.47, but a 3.54 GPA in his major when discounting graduate level courses which the student
incorporated into his undergraduate experience. The graduate level courses brought down
his overall GPA. For an illustration, visit the ABA’s website, available at
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/home.html (accessed from homepage by selecting ABA-
LSAC Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools and entering the LSAT and GPA
combinations of each of the aforementioned students) (last visited May 17, 2003). In June
2002 the results revealed that the Barry student with a LSAT/GPA combination of 138/2.39
qualified for admission into twenty-two fully approved schools, the second student qualified
for admission into thirteen schools, the third student qualified for admission into one school,
and the fourth student (using the lower GPA of 2.47) qualified for admission into thirty-three
schools. For a compelling perspective on the ABA’s use of the LSAT, see George B.
Shepherd, ABA Damages Black Law Schools, NAT’L L.J., May 14, 2001, at A23; see also
Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or Institutional Self Interest? 10 Reasons Why UC-Davis
Should Abandon the LSAT (and Why Other Good Law Schools Should Follow Suit), 34 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 593 (2001); William C. Kidder, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial
and Ethnic Differences in Educational Attainment?: A Study of Equality Achieving “Elite”
College Students, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1055 (2001).
246. See ABA LAW SCHOOL GUIDE, supra note 244, at 497.
total of 396 applicants with LSAT scores below 140, and twenty-one
schools admitted students with LSAT scores further below 140 than the
three aforementioned Barry students. In 2000, the University of Florida
admitted two students with LSAT scores between 135 and 139,245 Nova
University, a private Florida law school, admitted thirty-seven students in
that range,246 and Stetson, another private and highly-respected Florida law
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247. Id. at 653.
248. Letter from Sebert, supra note 19, at 3.
249. See id.
250. For a closer look at Finding 4, see Barry Site Report of 2000, supra note 226
(describing the new Florida A & M Law School [hereinafter FAMU]). The central Florida
market should decide whether the region is large enough for two law schools, not the ABA.
While there might be some overlap, Barry and FAMU would likely draw from different
resources. Both Barry and FAMU have feeder undergraduate schools. Barry is a Catholic
school with relationships to other Catholic institutions throughout the United States. FAMU
is an historically black school, also with relationships to other institutions throughout the
country. Pitting the two schools against each other as the ABA attempted to do is simply
wrong. See Myriam Marquez, In Barry-FAMU Flap, ABA Plays Divide and Conquer,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 16, 2001 at G-3.
251. See Barry Site Report of 2000, supra note 226, at Finding 4.
252. Id. at Finding 5.
253. Id. at Finding 29.
254. After the site visit from October 29 through November 1, 2000, the Florida
Legislature voted to authorize expanding two public law schools. Barry Site Report of 2000,
supra note 226, at 4. FAMU selected Orlando. In 2000, the Florida Legislature appropriated
$2.5 million for each law school. See Raju Chebium, Florida To Build Two Public Schools
school, admitted four students in that range.247 The University of Miami
refused to publish its scores.
Finally, in the Council’s decision to deny Barry accreditation, the
Council found that Barry “h[ad] not presented a reliable plan for bringing
it into full compliance with the Standards within three years.”248 The
Council pointed to Findings 4, 5, and 29 of the Accreditation Committee’s
Findings of Fact.249 Finding 4 refers to the two recently approved state law
schools, one of which chose to locate in Orlando, namely Florida A & M
Law School.250 Finding 4 merely made the observation that “[a]fter the
October 2000 site visit took place, the Florida Legislature determined that
one of the two additional publically funded law schools it had decided to
establish would be located in Orlando, as part of Florida A & M
University.”251 Finding 5 refers to grappling with the uncertainties “inherent
in the [accreditation] situation in which the Law School finds itself.”252
Reading Finding 29 as a negative statement makes no sense. It refers to
Barry expressing “a commitment to expend the funds necessary to develop
a quality program of legal education, and is committed to financing
significant deficits in the near term.”253
b. The Council Unlawfully Raised Anti-Competitive Concerns
The Council unlawfully denied Barry provisional accreditation because
of anti-competitive concerns regarding FAMU.254 The Council’s
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Simultaneously, May 29, 2000, available at http://www.cnn .com (accessed from homepage
by selecting Search and entering phrase “Florida Public Schools”) (last visited May 17,
2003). However, the Florida Legislature in 2001 appropriated only half of the funds
necessary. FAMU started classes in a renovated county building in the Fall of 2002, with
plans to build a $27.7 million building in 2003. See Melanie Yeager, Law School Opens Its
Doors, Sep. 3, 2002, available at http://www.tallahassee.com/mld/tallahassee/3989847.htm
(last visited May 2, 2003).
255. Transcript of Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar
of the ABA 41 (Feb. 17, 2002), available at http://www.lc.org (accessed from homepage by
selecting ABA Accreditation Research, Complaint Exhibits, then February 17, 2001,
Transcript of Council Meeting Executive Session) (last visited May 17, 2003) [hereinafter
Council Transcript].
256. Id. at 46.
257. Id. at 67. The Council is supposed to “act impartially and avoid even the
appearance of impropriety.” Id.; see also ABA Statement of Ethical Practices in the Process
of Law School Accreditation, ¶ 1; 34 C.F.R. § 602.21(b)(5) (1999) (stating that a recognized
accrediting agency must have “[c]lear and effective controls against conflicts of interest or
the appearance of conflicts of interest.”). A DOE approved accrediting agency “must
consistently apply and enforce its standards.” 34 C.F.R. § 602.18 (1999). An accrediting
agency “meets this requirement if [it] (a) [h]as effective controls against the inconsistent
application of the agency’s standards; (b) [b]ases decisions regarding accreditation and
preaccreditation on the agency’s published standards; and (c) [h]as a reasonable basis for
determining that the information the agency relies on for making accrediting decisions is
accurate.” Id.
consideration of another law school coming to Orlando was a main focus
of attention by Council member Dean Jeffrey Lewis. Chairperson Diane C.
Yu opened the Council’s meeting on February 17, 2001, by giving the floor
to Dean Lewis, who asked the following question: 
Have you made any assessment of the need for legal education in
Florida in light of the two public law schools that have been
authorized by the legislature in the [S]tate of Florida? One will be
in north Dade County and the other one I believe will be in Orange
County.255
Council member Pauline Schneider asked, “[w]hat percentage of your
currently enrolled students are residents of Florida?”256 Dean Lewis then
asked whether Barry’s enrollment “studies take into consideration the
public schools as well as Florida coastal [sic] in Jacksonville?”257
B. The Council Reverses the Accreditation Committee’s Recommendation
and Accredits Barry
On January 26, 2001, the Accreditation Committee recommended that
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258. The Site Team prepared a forty-one page report that mostly incorporated the earlier
Barry Site Report of 2000, but also added supplemental information. Barry Supplemental
Site Report, supra note 22.
259. See Staver v. ABA, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
260. The ABA contends that the accreditation process is confidential and that any
written information may be released only on the consent of the law school in question. See
Rules, supra note 54. Law schools are often reluctant to release accreditation information
out of fear that the school might anger the ABA. The ABA has insinuated that it does not
want law schools to release accreditation information. See Memo from John A. Sebert,
Consultant on Legal Education to the ABA, to Deans of ABA Approved Law Schools (May
23, 2001), available at http://www.lc.org (accessed from homepage by selecting ABA
Accreditation Research, American Bar Association Evaluation Reports on Public Law
Schools, then Memo from ABA to Law School Deans re: Accreditation Reports) (last visited
May 6, 2003) (url no longer available). Notwithstanding, public law schools are required to
hand over accreditation records under state public record laws. See, e.g., infra Appendix B.
261. See, e.g., Scott Powers, Barry Law School is Dealt Major Setback, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, June 5, 2001, at A-1 (reviewing the ABA’s dealings with Barry including a time
line); Scott Powers, ABA Panel Was Overruled When Barry Lost Bid for Accreditation,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 8, 2001, at B-1 (noting that ABA documents are normally
confidential, but the Orlando Sentinel had obtained the documents from court filings); Scott
Powers, Lots of Objections to Law Accreditation, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 9, 2001, at B-1
(quoting Dean Robert J. D’Agostino, then-Dean of John Marshall School of Law as saying,
“I would certainly characterize the ABA’s application of their standards as arbitrary and
capricious”); Scott Powers, Barry Granted Another Chance, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 17,
2001, at D-1 (quoting Mathew D. Staver as saying, “If it’s quality that’s at issue, Barry
should have gotten accredited a long time ago. The problem is, we’re dealing with the ABA
Barry receive provisional accreditation. A few weeks later, on February 17,
2001, the Council stunned most observers by reversing the Accreditation
Committee and denied provisional approval. Two significant events
occurred after the Council’s decision. First, Barry requested that the
Council reconsider its decision. The Council refused. Barry then filed an
appeal with the House, hoping the House would remand their application
back to the Council. The Council then agreed to continue the review
process by sending out another Site Team for a supplemental visit if Barry
would withdraw its appeal. Barry agreed, and a new Site Team visited
Barry in September of 2001.258
The second event to occur following the Council’s decision involved
a federal law suit that was filed against the ABA by several law students
and attorneys.259 One of the interesting aspects of this case was the
significant volume of material that the plaintiffs filed in federal court. The
ABA has always attempted to shield its accreditation deliberations behind
a cloud of secrecy.260 The documentation revealed not only information
about the ABA’s dealings with Barry, but the records also showed
inconsistent applications of the ABA Standards over the past several years.
The Florida261 and national262 media printed numerous articles criticizing
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political machinery.”); Scott Powers, Barry Student, Graduates, Challenge Bar, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 25, 2001, at D-1 (providing overview of federal law suit filed against the
ABA regarding Barry’s accreditation; article also distributed by the Associated Press on July
26, 2001); Holly Steep, Florida Law Students Taking ABA to Court, MIAMI HERALD, Aug.
6, 2001, at A-1; Scott Powers, Barry Isn’t Alone in ABA Clash: Two Other State Law
Schools Have Ongoing Fights with the American Bar Association, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Aug. 7, 2001, at A-1 (discussing the ABA’s unfair treatment of Florida State and the
University of Florida law schools); Robert Steinback, A Bum Rap from the Bar, MIAMI
HERALD, Aug. 8, 2001, at B-1 (discussing the Barry situation and blasting how the ABA
accreditation process limits minority enrollment); Editorial Board, ABA Is Micromanaging,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 8, 2001, at A-10 (“The ABA’s current rules lack specificity and
appear to vary considerably depending on who is interpreting them.”); Editorial Board,
Accrediting Barry, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 8, 2001, at A-24 (referring to the so-called
“musical deans”, which tends to occur at the time of accreditation review, the Editorial
Board stated: “As long as the ABA’s system remains arbitrary, inconsistent, and cloaked in
secrecy, schools will hire people who can play the game. The ABA fails to inspire
confidence by making such hires a necessity.”); Editorial Board, Be Fair with Barry,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 25, 2002, at A-16 (noting the “ever-changing of the ABA’s
concerns” and warning that a “lot of people will be watching to see how the ABA treats
Barry this time around”).
262. See, e.g., Katherine S. Mangan, Minority Students Sue ABA over its System for
Accrediting Law Schools, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 26, 2001, available at
http://chronicle.com (accessed from homepage by entering the term “articles” in the Search
box) (last visited Feb. 13, 2003). Tom Stabile, Barry Gets Recount, NAT’L JURIST 12 (Sept.
2001) (reviewing the lawsuit against the ABA over Barry’s accreditation). Although the
ABA accredited twenty-two law schools in the 1970s, it approved only seven between 1981
and 1993. Id. After a lawsuit and federal investigations began in 1993, the ABA “opened the
floodgates” and approved ten between 1994 and 2001. Id. 
263. See Marquez, supra note 250 (“It’s a twisted tale of capricious ABA rules coupled
with the power and prestige of large corporate law firms that like business just the way it is:
going their way.”).
264. See Accreditation Committee Report No. 2, supra note 24.
265. See Scott Powers, Bush Backs Barry’s Law Bid, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 18,
2002, at C-1 (reporting the both Florida Governor Jeb Bush and the Florida’s Attorney
General Bob Butterworth wrote strong letters to the ABA urging accreditation of Barry).
266. See Scott Powers, Barry May Get Boost from Lawmakers, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Jan. 30, 2002, at B-3 (noting that Florida lawmakers introduced a bill aimed at eliminating
the ABA accreditation process. The Orlando Sentinel editorial board wrote
several editorials highly critical of the ABA, stating at one point that we
should “bury the ABA.”263
An amazing role reversal then occurred. The Accreditation Committee
recommended against provisional accreditation in November of 2001.264
This caused both Florida Governor, Jeb Bush, and Florida Attorney
General, Bob Butterworth, to write strongly-worded letters to the ABA
encouraging accreditation of Barry.265 Florida legislators then filed a bill
threatening to repeal the rule that requires Florida students to graduate from
an ABA accredited law school.266 On February 2, 2002, the Council
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a law which requires Florida students to graduate from ABA accredited schools). “Also
welcoming the bill was FAMU’s law dean, Percy Luney, who said it could ease concerns of
prospective students who are nervous about committing to any unaccredited law school
because of what has happened to Barry.” Id.
267. See Scott Powers, Law School Gets Bar’s OK, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 3, 2002,
at B-1.
268. See Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Barry University School of Law Rehearing
at 1, (Fla. Apr. 24, 2001), available at http://www.law/fsu.edu/library (accessed from
homepage by selecting Law Library, Fla. Sup. Ct. Briefs and Opinions, SC02-0501 - SC02-
750, Docket # SC02-740, then Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Barry University School
of Law) (last visited May 30, 2003) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief]. Documents filed in
Barry’s case are available at http://www.flcourts.org (accessed from homepage by selecting
Press Page, Supreme Court Press Information High Profile Cases, Barry University Petition,
then Documents) (last visited June 6, 2003).
269. See Petition of Barry University School of Law at 15 (Fla. Apr. 30, 2002),
available at http://www.flcourts.org (accessed from homepage by selecting Press Page,
Supreme Court Press Information High Profile Cases, Barry University Petition, Documents,
then Filed_4-3-2002_Petition.pdf) (last visited June 6, 2003).
270. Accreditation Committee Report No. 2, supra note 24, at Finding 4. Accreditation
Committee Report No. 2, Findings 5-9 noted that Barry offered a traditional curriculum,
legal research and writing courses, electives and seminars, clinical programs, and exams,
which relied on short and long essays, and “require thoughtful integration of subject matter.”
271. Id. at Finding 10.
272. Id. at Finding 11.
reversed the Accreditation Committee and granted provisional
accreditation.267 The House then voted to affirm the Council’s decision on
February 4, 2002.268
1. The Accreditation Committee’s Report Recommending Against
Provisional Accreditation
Following the supplemental site visit in September 2001, the
Accreditation Committee met in Puerto Rico from November 1 to
November 3, 2001, to once again consider Barry.269 The Findings noted that
Barry’s “revised self study is comprehensive in scope and states goals and
objectives clearly.”270 The grade distribution showed 9.6% As, 21.6% Bs,
59.0% Cs, 7.4% Ds and 2.3% were Fs.271 The student writing requirements
“showed substantial effort and some insight: a few were of publishable
quality.”272
The Accreditation Committee Report No. 2 mentioned Barry’s student-
faculty ratio of 8:1, and that staffing of courses “is accomplished primarily
with full-time faculty, who devote substantially all working time to
teaching, legal scholarship and participation in Law School governance and
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273. Id. at Findings 12-14.
274. See id. at Findings 15-23.
275. Id. at Finding 34; see also id. at Findings 24-33.
276. See id. at Finding 35.
277. Id. at Finding 36.
278. See id. at Finding 12.
279. Id. at Conclusion.
280. See Scott Powers, Gifts Lift Barry’s Spirit, Confidence, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan.
service.”273 The Report then favorably discussed the students, the academic
assistance and retention programs, and noted that no student was admitted
with an LSAT score below 142.274 The Report then overviewed the Law
School administration, information services and finances, noting that Barry
University “is committed to subsidizing substantially the operations of the
Law School.”275 The Report next overviewed the facilities, noting the
number of buildings and the room for future expansion on twelve acres of
property.276 Commenting on Barry’s future projections for enrollment, the
Report noted the following: “In response to a question as to whether the
School will not have to reduce its admission standards to meet its
enrollment projections, both the Dean and the President indicated they
believed they would not have to do so.”277
The Accreditation Committee’s November Report never took issue
with the faculty, the curriculum, the facilities, the library, the students, the
academic admission, or the retention standard. In short, the Report never
criticized the outputs of Barry. However, the Accreditation Committee
nevertheless recommended against provisional accreditation.278 The Report
pointed to the future competition for students, which Barry would face
when a new state school would begin operation in Orlando at some future
date, stating that Barry would not be able to meet its enrollment targets for
the fall of 2003 to 2005, “without substantially reducing the academic
qualifications of those entering classes.”279 In other words, while not taking
issue with Barry’s educational program at the time of the current review,
the Accreditation Committee prognosticated that at some point in the
future, Barry may lower its academic standards in order to compete against
a yet-to-be-built public law school.
2. The Council’s Decision Overruling the Accreditation Committee
Following the Accreditation Committee’s recommendation to deny
Barry provisional accreditation, Barry officials backed up their
commitment to the law school by revealing that in a few short weeks the
university had raised $15.3 million dollars for the school.280 Then, as noted
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12, 2002, at C-1. 
281. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
282. Powers, Barry May Get Boost from Lawmakers, supra note 266.
283. See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 268.
284. See Petition of Barry University, supra note 269.
285. Nevertheless, those students who graduated before accreditation faced additional
obstacles after Barry’s accreditation. Those who graduated more than twelve months before
ABA accreditation and who desired to practice law in Florida needed an order of the Florida
Supreme Court. See Jan Pudlow, Budding Legal Careers Put on Hold Barry University
Graduates Abort Their Fate, 29 FLA. BAR NEWS 10 (2002); see also In re Barry Univ. Sch.
of Law, 821 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 2002); RULES OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RELATING TO
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR R. 2-11.1, 4.13. 
286. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
287.  See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
288.  15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
above, Florida’s Governor and Attorney General both wrote letters to the
ABA strongly urging that the ABA approve the law school.281 A week prior
to the Council meeting, Florida legislators filed bills which were designed
to repeal the rule that required students to graduate from an ABA
accredited law school.282
On February 2, 2002, the Council met and again reversed the
Accreditation Committee.283 This time the Council voted to grant
provisional approval to Barry.284 The Council’s decision was affirmed by
the House on February 4, 2002.285
V. THE ABA’S ACCREDITATION PROCESS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal.”286 Section 2 applies to monopolies.287 The Clayton
Act provides that 
any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court of the United States in the district in which the
defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover three fold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee.288 
Any “person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
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289. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2000). In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104,
107-13 (1982), the Court refers to 15 U.S.C. § 15 (damages) as Section 4 and to 15 U.S.C.
§ 26 (injunctive relief) as Section 16. For general information on antitrust laws, see
Kimberly L. King, An Antitrust Primer for Trade Association Counsel, 75 FLA. BAR J. 26
(2001); Jeffery C. Sun & Philip T.K. Daniel, The Sherman Act Antitrust Provisions and
Collegiate Action: Should There Be a Continued Exception for the Business of the
University?, 25 J.C. & U.L. 451 (1999); Thomas D. Morgan, The Impact of Antitrust Law
on the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 415 (1998); Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust
Law and Trade and Professional Association Standards and Certification, 19 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 471 (1994); Diane P. Wood, “Unfair” Trade Injury: A Competition-Based
Approach, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust
Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J. 305 (1987); Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust
Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696 (1986); William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust
Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445 (1985); see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION (2003).
290. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
291. See id. at 485.
292. Id. at 479. The Supreme Court has rarely addressed the issue of how to determine
the area of injury. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Perkins
v. Standard Oil, 395 U.S. 642 (1969). In McCready, the Court did not rely on any of the
various tests used by the Courts of Appeal, nor did it express any opinion as to the relative
utility of these tests. McCready, 457 U.S. at 465.
293. McCready, 457 U.S. at 479.
294. Id.
295. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 n.6 (1982).
and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having
jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a
violation of the anti-trust laws . . . .”289
In Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready,290 a Blue Cross subscriber was
denied reimbursement for treatment by a psychologist. Acknowledging that
the conspiracy was designed to restrict competition among psychologists,
the Court held that the subscriber had standing.291 “The harm to McCready
and her class was clearly foreseeable; indeed, it was a necessary step in
effecting the ends of the alleged illegal conspiracy.”292 “The availability of
the § 4 remedy . . . is not a question of the specific intent of the
conspirators.”293 Furthermore, “the remedy cannot reasonably be restricted
to those competitors whom the conspirators hoped to eliminate from the
market.”294 The standing analysis under § 4 is designed to consider the class
of persons affected by the anti-competitive activity. The more remote the
injury, the less likely standing will be granted. On the other hand, the
standing inquiry under § 16 (injunctive relief) is not always identical to the
standing analysis under § 4 (damages).295 Section 16 raises no threat of
multiple lawsuits or duplicative recoveries, and therefore “some of the
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296. Id.
297. Id. (quoting Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 261).
298. See Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 753 F.2d 1354,
1358 (6th Cir. 1985).
299. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE ¶ 13.3e, at 602 (1999).
300. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 113 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo-Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)); see also William Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust
Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445 (1985).
301. Graduating from an unaccredited law school “carries a stigma of being second
class.” Oliphant, supra note 222, at 874-75.
factors other than antitrust injury that are appropriate to a determination of
standing under § 4 are not relevant under § 16.”296 “[T]he fact is that one
injunction is as effective as 100, and, concomitantly, that 100 injunctions
are no more effective than one.”297 Since § 16 is “designed to stop
anticompetitive behavior in its incipiency,” a lower threshold for standing
is required than for § 4.298 “The ‘threatened’ injury requirement of 16 may
indeed require a smaller showing of the amount or even the fact of injury
than is needed to prove damages under § 4.”299 In order to seek injunctive
relief under § 16, “a private plaintiff must allege threatened loss or damage
‘of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and that flows from
that which makes defendant’s acts unlawful.’”300 Thus, standing to pursue
a damages action under § 4 considers whether the plaintiff is in the target
area of the defendant’s anti-competitive activity. This is a narrower
question than standing to pursue injunctive relief under § 16, which simply
considers whether there is antitrust injury. An antitrust violation includes
a broader class of people. Students and recent graduates of a law school
would have standing under both § 4 and § 16.
Students, graduates, and most likely attorneys seeking to employ the
students and graduates, are similar to the subscribers in McCready. Even
if the graduates could become licensed despite the ABA’s refusal to
accredit the school, these graduates will likely suffer an injury separate and
apart from the law license. This separate injury may take the form of a
“stigma” which will follow the students and graduates throughout their
professional careers.301 For some, the injury may have nothing to do with
the inability to obtain a law license. For example, many people attend law
school to obtain a law degree but have no interest in the practice of law.
These include individuals desiring jobs in the corporate world, those
seeking work as a civil servant in government agencies such as the FBI,
those who seek a political career, or plan to teach in law schools. Moreover,
most law schools require graduation from an ABA accredited school as a
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302. The Third Circuit in Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American
Bar Association, 107 F.3d 1026, 1038 (3d Cir. 1997), left open the door to pursue an
antitrust injury against the ABA based on stigma. However, the court found that the school
did not present enough evidence on this issue. Interestingly, although the Third Circuit did
not accept the law school’s complaint against the ABA, the subsequent DOJ Consent Decree
incorporated many of the concerns raised by the Massachusetts School of Law. It should also
be pointed out that the law school objected entirely to ABA accreditation. The school made
no allegation that it complied with the ABA Standards. Rather, the law school argued that
the Standards themselves violated antitrust laws. Id. at 1031.
303. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1911).
304. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944); see
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
305. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 553.
306. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000) (exempting labor unions and agricultural
cooperatives); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1012 (2000) (exempting insurance where the industry is
already subject to state regulation); 15 U.S.C. § 2158 (2000) (exempting certain activities
which further national defense objectives).
307. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
requirement for entering an LL.M. program. Thus, the injury and the stigma
are separate and independent from the ability to become a licensed
attorney.302
To bring an antitrust action, a plaintiff must show (1) an agreement or
a conspiracy that (2) unreasonably restrains trade (3) which affects
interstate commerce.303
A. The ABA’s Action with Respect to Barry Was Private Action
Referring to the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court stated that
“[l]anguage more comprehensive is difficult to conceive.”304 Legislative
history “shows a carefully studied attempt to bring within the Act every
person engaged in business whose activities might restrain or monopolize
commercial intercourse among the states.”305 Congress has made few
exceptions to the Act.306 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,307 the Court
applied the Act to a state and local bar association, stating:
The nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide
sanctuary from the Sherman Act, nor is the public-service aspect
of professional practice controlling in determining whether §1
includes professions. Congress intended to strike as broadly as it
could in §1 of the Sherman Act, and to read into it so wide an
exemption as that urged on us would be at odds with that purpose.
The language of §1 of the Sherman Act, of course, contains no
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308. Id. at 787 (citations omitted).
309. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
310. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
311. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); see also William H. Page, Interest Groups,
Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation,
1987 DUKE L.J. 618 (1987).
312. Parker, 317 U.S. at 344.
313. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791.
314. Portinga, supra note 1, at 653; see also George B. Shepherd & William G.
Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA Accreditation and Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2091 (1998); Rothbardt, supra note 11; Henry First, Competition in the Legal Industry
(II): An Antitrust Analysis, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1049 (1979) (discussing the history of the
ABA and applying antitrust analysis).
exception. . . . And our cases have repeatedly established that there
is a heavy presumption against implicit exemptions.308
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,309 the
Court applied the Sherman Act to an engineers’ organization that
prohibited its members from bargaining with a customer until the customer
selected a specific engineer for the job. In Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society,310 the Court applied the Act to a medical society which
established a schedule of maximum fees. In Parker v. Brown,311 the Court
held that anti-competitive conduct undertaken pursuant to a mandate from
state law is immune from antitrust liability. Parker involved a raisin
producer who sought to enjoin enforcement of California’s Agricultural
Prorate Act.312 However, in Goldfarb, the Court rejected arguments by a
state and local bar that the Act did not apply to a voluntary bar association.
The ABA argued that the fee schedule authorized by the Supreme Court of
Virginia was immune from antitrust liability. The Court ruled that the fee
schedule was private anti-competitive activity and thus the Act applied. “It
is not enough that, as the County Bar puts it, anti-competitive conduct is
‘prompted’ by state action; rather, anti-competitive activities must be
compelled by the direction of the State acting as a sovereign.”313 “Although
states have relied upon ABA accreditation decisions, the ABA cannot argue
that states have authorized it to issue specific accreditation standards that
restrain trade.”314 
A state law or regulatory scheme, including one where a state bar
recognizes the ABA as a law school accrediting body, cannot be the basis
for antitrust immunity unless “first, the State has articulated a clear and
affirmative policy to allow the anti-competitive conduct, and second, the
State provides active supervision of anti-competitive conduct undertaken
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315. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 631 (1992) (citing Cal.
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)); see also
Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988); S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United
States, 471 U.S. 48, 57 (1985).
316. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 634 (quoting Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100-01) (internal quotations
and citations omitted). 
317. Id. at 638.
318. Id. at 636 (citing Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398-99
(1978)).
319. In Lawline v. ABA, 956 F.2d 1378, 1383 (7th Cir. 1992), the court held that the
ABA could not be held liable for an antitrust injury resulting from the Illinois Supreme
by private actors.”315 The Court explained:
The active supervision requirement stems from the recognition
that where a private party is engaging in the anti-competitive
activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own
interests, rather than the governmental interest of the State. . . . The
requirement is designed to ensure that the state action doctrine will
shelter only the particular anticompetitive acts of private parties
that, in the judgement of the State, actually further state regulatory
policies. To accomplish this purpose, the active supervision
requirement mandates that the State exercise ultimate control over
the challenged anti-competitive conduct. . . . The mere presence of
some state involvement or monitoring does not suffice. . . . The
active supervision prong of the Midcal test requires that state
officials have and exercise power to review particular
anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that
fail to accord with state policy. Absent such a program of
supervision, there is no realistic assurance that a private party’s
anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely
the party’s individual interests.316
The “mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitution
for a decision by the State.”317 Indeed, “state-action immunity is disfavored,
much as are repeals by implication.”318 In Ticor, the Court found that the
states authorized regulatory practices but did not compel the establishment
of specific rates and therefore rejected a state action immunity defense.
Although most state supreme courts have recognized the ABA as an
accrediting body, the courts do not actively supervise or compel application
of the Standards, nor do they have any knowledge of the Council’s
application of such Standards to a specific law school.319
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Court’s adoption of ethical standards developed and promulgated by the ABA. However,
Lawline is distinguishable from ABA accreditation because, unlike ethical standards which
the state supreme courts may adopt and enforce, the state supreme courts have never adopted
or reviewed or enforced the ABA Standards. For the same reason, Zavaletta v. ABA, 721 F.
Supp. 96 (E.D. Va. 1989), is inapposite. Zavaletta was one of the first suits filed against the
ABA regarding accreditation. (Before Zavaletta, a law school that was associated with Oral
Roberts University sued the ABA because it was denied accreditation for religious reasons.
See Oral Roberts Univ. v. ABA, No. 81-C-3171 (N.D. Ill. 1981); See also Nicholas P.
Cafardi, Catholic Law Schools and Ex Corde Ecclesiae, or What Makes a Law School
Catholic?, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 7, 11 n.22 (2001)). Zavaletta filed suit because the ABA
initially refused to accredit CBN University School of Law (renamed Regent University
School of Law), which was founded by Pat Robertson. The concern that the ABA expressed
during the Council meeting centered around academic freedom in light of Mr. Robertson’s
strong religious views. See Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings Before the Council of
the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (Feb. 23, 1989 Denver) (on file
with authors); see also Letter from James P. White, Consultant on Legal Education to the
ABA, to Bob G. Slasser, President of CBN University and Herbert W. Titus, Dean of CBN
University School of Law and Government (Feb. 10, 1989) (on file with authors) (referring
to Council concerns regarding the impact of the school’s religious beliefs on academic
freedom). The students filed suit, alleging that the ABA was a state actor for purposes of
constitutional due process, and also alleged violation of the Sherman Act. The district court
first dismissed the state action claims, and then as if an oversight, issued a second short
opinion regarding the antitrust claims. However, instead of challenging the process, the suit
was a frontal attack against the ABA. Interestingly, shortly after the case was appealed, the
ABA agreed to provisionally accredit CBN on the condition that the appeal be dismissed.
The case of Brandt v. ABA, 1997 WL 279762 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 1997), provides no
clarification. In Brandt, the plaintiff was served with a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment by the ABA and the law school dean. The plaintiff filed no response, and thus the
case was dismissed without discussing the merits.
320. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng. Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 571 (1982).
321. Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 314, at 2238-39.
322. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
323. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 140-41.
Standard-setting groups such as the ABA “can be rife with
opportunities for anti-competitive activity.”320 “[A]lthough many states
have delegated authority to the ABA to determine which law schools
should receive accreditation, none has clearly and affirmatively authorized
the ABA to adopt and enforce each of its many anti-competitive procedures
and standards.”321 The ABA cannot claim immunity under the so-called
petitioning exception. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine permits private
competitive actors to influence government action without violating the
Sherman Act.322 Noerr-Pennington only protects action that involves
petitioning323 and does not apply when the association applies its own
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324. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
325. See id. at 500.
326. Id. 
327. Id. at 506.
328. Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026, 1038-39 (3d Cir.
1997). In Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984), the state action doctrine applied where
the state supreme court delegated the administration of the bar admissions to a committee
because the court retained sole authority to determine which candidates should be admitted
to the practice of law. Similarly, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the
Court found that where the state supreme court adopted and enforced the specific ABA’s
advertising rule, the immunity doctrine applied.
standards. In Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,324 the Court
found that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine did not apply to a standard-
setting process, by a private organization, that thwarts competition.325
“Accordingly, private standard-setting associations have traditionally been
objects of antitrust scrutiny.”326 
Unlike the publicity campaign in Noerr, the activity at issue here
did not take place in the open political arena, where partisanship is
the hallmark of decision-making, but within the confines of a
private standard-setting process. The validity of conduct within
that process has long been defined and circumscribed by the
antitrust laws without regard to whether the private standards are
likely to be adopted into law.327
The ABA’s Standards have not been compelled or adopted by the state, nor
has their action with respect to Barry University been adopted, supervised
or compelled by the state. The process is generally shrouded in secret, and
the action is undertaken primarily behind closed doors. As the Third Circuit
noted the following:
[T]he ABA is not immune in the actual enforcement of its
standards. The state action relates to the use of the results of the
accreditation process, not the process itself. The process is entirely
private conduct which has not been approved or supervised
explicitly by any state. Thus, the ABA’s enforcement of an anti-
competitive standard which injures [potential plaintiffs] would not
be immune from possible antitrust liability. Extending Noerr
immunity to this type of private activity would run counter to
Allied Tube.328
58 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1
329. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) (holding
that the dissemination of trade information may constitute price-fixing).
330. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975); see also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (holding that professional or trade associations
are subject to the Sherman Act). 
331. Rothbardt, supra note 11, at 465.
332. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 500 (citing 7 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1477
(1986)).
333. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
334. See id. at 687-89.
335. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
336. Id. at 559.
337. AREEDA, supra note 332, ¶ 1477.
B. The Agreement or Conspiracy
Price-fixing involves some type of agreement. The government can
establish the existence of an agreement either by implication, if the parties
exchanged material information or though direct evidence that an
agreement actually existed.329 Goldfarb noted that “anti-competitive activity
by lawyers may exert a restraint on commerce.”330 As one scholar pointed
out: “The adoption and enforcement of the ABA standards by each
accredited law school is sufficient evidence to prove an agreement.”331 The
ABA is a standard-setting association and “[t]ypically, private standard-
setting associations, like the Association in this case, include members
having horizontal and vertical business relations,” thus, “[t]rade and
standard-setting associations routinely [are] treated as continuing
conspiracies of their members.”332
In National Society, the Court never inquired as to whether the entity
had conspired with anyone, instead, it saw the issue as whether an
agreement among competitors unjustifiably restrained competition.333
While the Society’s rules were not disturbed, the Court enjoined
enforcement of the Society’s anti-competitive activity.334
In American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel,335 a group
of competitors created an organization to examine and promulgate industry
product standards.336 This function was not challenged. “The formulation
of standards, their interpretation, and product examination were ordinarily
performed by experts, or committees of experts, drawn from the industry
and serving the organization on a voluntary basis.”337 The Court imposed
liability 
in order to encourage the organization to supervise those who acted
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338. Id. 
339. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
340. See id. at 3-4.
341. See id. at 4.
342. AREEDA, supra note 332, ¶ 1477.
343. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
344. AREEDA, supra note 332, ¶ 1477.
345. Id.
346. Although the official statement by the ABA is that the Standards do not require
a certain score on the LSAT, and that the LSAT is not the only permissible test, it is common
knowledge that schools seeking provisional accreditation are advised not to admit students
with LSAT scores under 142. See Standard 503 (“A law school that is not using the Law
School Admission Test sponsored by the Law School Admission Council shall establish that
it is using an acceptable test.”). As noted in this article, a score of 142 automatically
eliminates most African-Americans and Puerto Ricans. See supra note 245. Additionally,
there is not one ABA accredited law school in America which uses an entrance test other
than the LSAT. ABA LAW SCHOOL GUIDE, supra note 244, “The LSAT is required for
admission to all United States and Canadian Law Schools and is taken by more than 100,000
people each year.” Law School Admission Council, available at http://www.lsac.org
with apparent authority in its behalf. The underlying antitrust
violation was apparently based not on a possible conspiracy
between the organization and the direct employers of the
misbehaving volunteers, but on its members’ conspiracy to
promulgate and administer industry standards.338
In Associated Press v. United States,339 a number of newspapers created
the Associated Press (AP) as a vehicle for exchanging news.340 The AP
rules allowed a member to obstruct the admission of a local competitor.341
Although the government regarded the AP itself as lawful, “the
organization’s admission rules were treated as a conspiratorial ‘boycott’
decision by the members.”342 Similarly, in Goldfarb, and in Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange,343 “the challenged behavior was treated as a
conspiracy among the members.”344 “There seems to be no conceptual
difficulty in treating organizations created to serve their member-
competitors or to regulate their market behavior as continuing conspiracies
of the members.”345
Not only are the ABA Standards an agreement between the ABA, law
schools, and others, the ABA itself is a continuing conspiracy among its
members. Moreover, in adopting and enforcing the Standards, the ABA has
engaged in concerted activity among the Association and with the Law
School Admission Council (which administers the LSAT), the Association
of American Law Schools and others.346 In applying the Standards to law
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(accessed from homepage by selecting Research Grants then Law School Admission
Council) (last visited May 7, 2003). The reason is evident to anyone who has been involved
in the ABA accreditation process. The authors cannot find any instances where the ABA has
ever recognized a test other than the LSAT.
347. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
(1961); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Among many lost
opportunities, law schools which are not ABA approved are precluded from attending the
Law School Admissions Council’s recruiting forums. The LSAC produces the LSAT. See
About LSAC, available at http://www.lsac.org (Accessed from homepage by selecting
About LSAC) (last visited May 7, 2003).
348. The ABA currently approves the following schools despite their bar passage rates:
Thomas Jefferson (33%), Western State (34%), Whittier (39%), The District of Columbia
(24%), Howard (32%), Florida Coastal (45%), Southern University Law Center (44%),
Pontifical Catholic (47%) and Regent (39%), along with many others in the 50% category.
See ABA LAW SCHOOL GUIDE, supra note 244, at 827-32. Many familiar with the ABA
accreditation process suggest that it is more difficult to win provisional accreditation than
it is to maintain accreditation once granted. This double standard is often apparent when the
ABA criticizes a school seeking provisional approval for accepting students with low LSAT
scores while allowing fully approved schools to admit students with the same, or sometime
lower, LSATs. See discussion of LSAT scores, supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
Once a school joins the club, it is hard to get thrown out especially after full accreditation.
Fully accredited law schools remain fully accredited for many years although almost every
report the ABA claims they are not in compliance with the standards. See infra Appendix
B (discussing noncompliance of the University of North Carolina from 1993 until 2000).
Perhaps this is due to the political fallout that would occur if the ABA revoked a school’s
accreditation. Whatever the reason, the current system is neither fair nor objective.
349. The ABA Standards are far from precise and leave a great deal of interpretation
to the Council. Most law schools seeking ABA approval have only one question—what
specific and objective criteria must the school meet to be accredited? This process seems to
work in other situations outside of ABA accreditation. There’s no reason the criteria for
obtaining and maintaining accreditation should not be easily understood and uniformly
applied.
schools, and obviously in regard to Barry University, the ABA has
conspired not to deal with the schools it chooses not to accredit.347 The
ABA did not objectively evaluate the product Barry produces, namely,
individuals who are prepared to enter the market of lawyers.348 The ABA’s
arbitrary actions often force customers not to buy a product offered by the
law school. If the reason for refusing accreditation to any one school had
anything to do with the quality of the education, then one could perhaps
justify the ABA’s decision not to deal with the school. However, when the
ABA acts like a political machine, arbitrarily granting accreditation to some
schools while shutting out others, and when law schools have little or no
idea how to comply with the standardless Standards,349 then the ABA
crosses the line into anti-competitive activity.
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350. Allied Tube Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 n.6 (1988). 
351. Id. at 500 n.5 (quoting AREEDA, supra note 332, ¶ 1503, at 373).
352. Id. at 500.
353. Id.
354. See Accreditation Committee Report No. 1, supra note 227, at 7.
355. See supra note 226.
356. See Council Transcript, supra note 255.
357. See Barry Supplemental Site Report, supra note 22. Accreditation Committee
Report No. 2, supra note 24, at 12.
358. See Accreditation Committee Report No. 2, supra note 24.
C. The ABA Has Imposed An Unreasonable Restraint On Trade
While not all restraints are unlawful, unreasonable restraints violate the
Sherman Act. “Concerted efforts to enforce (rather than just agree upon)
private product standards face more rigorous antitrust scrutiny.”350 The
ABA’s application of the Standards may raise anti-competitive concerns,
and result in an unreasonable restraint on trade. Product standardization
might impair competition in several ways. “[It] might deprive some
consumers of a desired product, eliminate quality competition, exclude
rival producers, or facilitate oligopolistic pricing by easing rivals’ ability
to monitor each other’s prices.”351 “There is no doubt that the members of
such associations often have economic incentives to restrain competition
and that the product standards set by such associations have the serious
potential for anti-competitive harm.”352 That is why “private standard-
setting associations have traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny.”353
Barry University received an overwhelmingly favorable report from
both the ABA Site Team and the Accreditation Committee, which
recommended provisional accreditation in January 2001.354 However,
during the February 2001 meeting, the Council ignored its own rules by
instigating a de novo review, and impermissibly delved into anti-
competitive considerations.355 The question of whether Barry could
compete in the market with the addition of other schools concerned the
Council.356 The issue in the Barry case became even more clear when the
Council dispatched another Site Team for a supplement site visit in
September 2001. Although the second Site Team once again gave an
extremely favorable report, the Accreditation Committee this time
recommended against granting Barry University provisional
accreditation.357 At no time did the Accreditation Committee take issue with
the academic program offered by Barry.358 Instead, the Accreditation
Committee focused (as did the Council in February 2001) solely on the
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359. As already argued, competition among law schools should not be a topic of
concern to the ABA. Even if one could argue otherwise, shouldn’t the question be instead
posed to the not yet existing school whenever it applies for accreditation?
360. The discussion regarding the comparisons of Barry to the other provisionally
approved schools is not meant to cast any aspersions on these schools, nor are the
comparisons meant to suggest that these schools fail to provide a quality education. Rather,
the comparisons are meant only to shed light on the capricious actions of the ABA with
respect to Barry.
361. See infra Appendix C (comparing provisionally approved law schools).
362. See Council Transcript, supra note 255, at 3.
363. See id. at 4-5.
364. Id. at 10-11.
365. See id. at 10-11, 27-28.
366. See id. at 11.
367. Id. at 32. 
threat of competition with a future state law school.359 These concerns are
purely anti-competitive and have no business in the context of
accreditation. The ABA should only consider the output of the school, not
competing market factors. In delving into these impermissible areas, the
ABA unreasonably restrains trade, and thus precludes a broad class of
students and graduates from entering the legal profession. The
unreasonableness of the restraint becomes more evident, and the anti-
competitive nature more apparent, when comparing Barry to four of the law
schools which received provisional accreditation since 1998.360
1. Barry Compared to the Only Law School Provisionally Approved in
2001361
Appalachian School of Law (Appalachian) appeared before the Council
for provisional accreditation consideration on February 17, 2001, the same
day as Barry.362 Appalachian appointed its new dean only a few months
prior to the meeting.363 The meeting transcript illustrates the sharp contrast
between Appalachian and Barry. It is a private law school located in a
“very isolated, very rural community,” two hours from the nearest airport,
one and a half hours from the nearest mall, and one hour from the nearest
bookstore.364 At the time of the meeting, virtually no opportunities to intern
or clerk arose during the school year.365 Teaching loads were heavy.366
Appalachian, the Council noted, located in “literally [an] all-white region.
Professor Dale Ruben, an African-American, . . . is only the second
African-American person ever to vote in Buchanon County, and the first
person only voted once, and Dale has already improved that record.”367 The
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368. See id. at 12-15.
369. See id. at 33-34.
370. See Barry Site Report of 2000, supra note 226.
371. See Council Transcript, supra note 255, at 26.
372. See id. at 12.
373. See id. at 9.
374. See UNLV Report, supra note 241.
375. See id.
376. See id.; see also ABA-Approved Law Schools, available at http://www.abanet .org
(accessed from homepage by selecting Law Student Resources, Legal Education, then ABA-
Approved Law Schools) (last visited May 7, 2003).
377.  Id. at 2.
378.  Id. at 3. 
379. See id. (“Of the 1,185 grades in the spring, fall and summer sessions, only thirty-
five were C- or lower [2.9%]; only ten were D [.8%] and only one was F [.08].”).
school has racial, gender and faculty tensions.368 Some students have filed
grievances citing use of racial epithets.369 In contrast, to Appalachian, Barry
has no racial or gender tensions. In fact, the student body is thirty-seven
percent minority, and the faculty is approximately thirty percent minority,
of which forty-three percent are female.370 Appalachian’s LSAT scores for
2000 were lower than Barry’s and the Council anticipated the 2001 scores
would be no better.371
Whereas Appalachian announced its inaugural board for the
Appalachian Journal of Law in 2000, Barry established its board in 1997
and published its first law review volume, focused on juvenile justice, in
2000.372 Barry offers significant clinical and internship opportunities, and
received a grant from the State of Florida of between $800,000 and
$900,000 to begin a Social Justice Clinic.373 
2. Barry Compared to the Only Law School Provisionally Approved in
2000
An ABA Site Team visited William S. Boyd School of Law at the
University of Las Vegas (UNLV) on November 14-17, 1999.374 The law
school began on August 17, 1998 and applied for provisional accreditation
in August of 1999.375 The Accreditation Committee considered this school
in April of 2000 and granted it provisional accreditation the following
June.376 At the time of the Site Team’s visit, “[m]any elements of the
program were not developed.”377 “The upper class curriculum was still in
the process of development . . . [and the] curriculum for skills development
had not been finalized.”378 The grades were highly inflated.379 “The school
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380. ABA LAW SCHOOL GUIDE, supra note 244, at 445.
381. UNLV Report, supra note 241, at 5.
382. See id. at 6. 
383. See id. at 8. 
384. See id. at 9-10 (noting that UNLV’s library staff cautioned that “it soon could find
itself stretched to meet the service demands of non-law school constituencies”). The library
had only 7,112 titles consisting of 48,544 hard copy volumes and its budget “[would] be
insufficient in the light of escalating costs for legal continuation and international materials
. . . and [would] be hard pressed to build even a minimal [foreign and international law]
collection without a budgetary adjustment.” Id. The adequacy of the building housing the
library also concerned the Site Team. Id.
385. See id. at 13; see also Standards, supra note 67, at 202(a), 302(c)-(d), 303, 403,
405(a), 606, 701.
386. See Barry Site Report of 2000, supra note 226, at 3. 
387. Id. at 30.
388. See Barry Site Report of 1999, supra note 237; Barry Site Report of 2000, supra
note 226.
389. Barry Site Report of 2000, supra note 226, at 30.
ha[d] elected not to publish an admission profile using data from the Fall
2000 admission cycle because that data may not [have] accurately
reflect[ed] the applicant pool foreseen in subsequent years.”380
Furthermore, the “lawyering process course [was] deficient in academic
oversight . . . . ”381 The Site Team worried that “faculty involvement in
governance may distract the members from the more academic pursuits,”
thereby impeding scholarship.382 The law journal and the moot court
program were not developed.383 Additionally, the Site Report expressed
sincere concerns about UNLV’s library.384 The Accreditation Committee
ultimately recommended approval, but suggested that the school improve
on overall standards in order to be fully accreditation compliant.385
In contrast to the thirteen page report on UNLV’s substandard status,
the thirty-nine page report on Barry glows with approval. Barry owns the
new facilities it occupies.386 As opposed to the 7,112 titles carried at
UNLV, Barry had “38,404 titles comprised of 180,533 volumes, . . . 1,644
active serial subscriptions for 1,638 titles [and] . . . 21 CD-ROM titles.”387
Barry’s library had received high praise from every Site Team visiting the
school.388 Moreover, the main university library at the Miami Shores
campus “provides [Barry] with a full complement of traditional and
innovative library services,” including an “on-line catalog of more than
600,000 items and almost 150 electronic data bases, 133 electronic
journals, Web bibliographies and an online periodical directory of 2,600
titles.”389 Also in contrast to UNLV, Barry’s self study was deemed
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390. Id. at 5. 
391. See id. at 9 (“Trial Advocacy and Florida Civil Practice are offered frequently and
have great demand from students. Thus, trial work skills receive more emphasis, although
mediation courses are also available. The school’s strong performance in extramural trial
performance competition attests to the value of this particular educational experience.”).
392. See id. at 11. 
393. See id.
394. Id. at 12. 
395. Id. at 14-15.
396. Id. at 23. 
397. See id. at 38-39.
398. See ABA Accreditation Committee, Action of the Accreditation Committee Report
1 (Apr. 1999), available at http://www.lc.org (accessed from homepage by selecting ABA
Accreditation Research, Complaint Exhibits, then Florida Coastal Report) (last visited May
12, 2003) [hereinafter Coastal Report]. Prior to issuance of a June 1996 Consent Decree with
the United States Department of Justice, which required the ABA to accredit for profit
schools, the ABA had refused to do so. Chapman School of Law was the first for-profit
school accredited by the ABA. It received provisional accreditation in February 1998. See
Parham Williams, Greetings from the Dean, available at http://www.chapman.edu/law
“comprehensive” in the Site Report.390 Further, Barry offers significant
skills-oriented coursework.391 Its law review program was underway at the
time of the Site Visit and the Site Team reviewed a draft copy of the first
law review volume, which has now been published.392 Moreover, the moot
court and trial advocacy programs were highly competitive.393 
The Site Report also made favorable findings regarding Barry’s faculty,
stating that “the range of legal education and other advanced degrees held
by the faculty is impressive.”394 It noted the Barry faculty’s significant
publication activity and visiting professor fellowships at foreign law
schools, and “observed high-quality classroom teaching, with few
exceptions, and observed generally high levels of student preparation and
participation.”395 Furthermore, Barry fulfilled a need in the local legal
community. “Numerous statements were made of the community’s need for
Barry graduates to service unmet legal needs in the surrounding
counties.”396 The Site Team praised the facilities, noting its room for
expansion. Thus, Barry received a glowing recommendation for provisional
accreditation.397
3. Barry Compared to the Only Law School Provisionally Approved in
1999
Florida Coastal School of Law (Florida Coastal) is a for-profit
school.398 The school leased facilities in Jacksonville, Florida at the time of
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(accessed from homepage by selecting General Information then Greetings from the Dean)
(last visited Feb. 16, 2003).
399. See Coastal Report, supra note 398, at 3. The school was “exploring and assessing
permanent site options” as the school was renting offices in temporary facilities, much like
UNLV. Id. at 9.
400. See id. at 4.
401. Id. at 5.
402. See id. 
403. See id. at 6. 
404. See id. 
405. See id. Indeed, “[a]n issue of concern about the clinical program [was] the
appointment of a full-time permanent director. [At the time of the report,] the duties [were]
being shared by a paid consultant who teaches at the University of Florida and a professor
who teaches at Florida Coastal.” Id.
406. Id. at 8. LSAT scores in the 25th percentile were in the 138 range, but Barry was
faulted for admitting one student with a 138 and one with a 139 LSAT. See supra note 244.
407. Coastal Report, supra note 398, at 9; cf. Shepherd, ABA Damages Black Law
Schools, supra note 245.
408. See Coastal Report, supra note 398, at 9.
409. See Barry Site Report of 2000, supra note 226, at 14.
the Site Visit.399 The student-faculty ratio in 1997 was 28-1 and in 1998,
19.2-1.400 With respect to “faculty scholarship,” the Site Team noted “the
lack of prior teaching and writing experience by some faculty members”
and were concerned about the “other demands currently made on them.”401
The library contents were comparable in size to those at Barry.402 The
previous action letter expressed concern about grade inflation, as no
students had been academically dismissed.403 Some students in need of
academic help appeared not to benefit from the available voluntary, rather
than mandatory, academic support programs.404 The school had no law
clinics, although some were being planned for the future.405
The Site Team further noted that “comparing the GPA and LSAT
scores for the entering students at Florida Coastal with those of other
Florida law schools, one would project that Florida Coastal’s bar passage
rates would be in the lowest in the state.”406 Additionally, the minority class
“declined from 39% in 1997 to 24% in 1998, in large part as a result of the
termination of the ‘special student’ program.”407 Ultimately, the Coastal
Report C recommended that the school receive provisional accreditation,
but noted that the school needed to address certain areas to be in full
compliance with several ABA Standards (302(a), 303, 301(a) and 501(b)
and 701-3).408
In contrast, Barry’s faculty have excellent academic credentials and
have extensively published.409 No mention was made in Coastal’s thirteen
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410. See id. at 9, 11; see also infra Appendix C.
411. See Approved Law Schools, available at http://www.abanet.org (accessed from
homepage by selecting Law Student Resources, Legal Education, then ABA Approved Law
Schools (last visited May 7, 2003).
412. See Letter from James P. White, Consultant on Legal Education to the ABA, to
Dr. Julius F. Nimmons, Jr., Acting President of the University of the District of Columbia,
and Dean William L. Robinson, Dean of DC (Feb. 5, 1998), available at http://www.lc.org
(accessed from homepage by selecting ABA Accreditation Research, ABA Evaluation
Reports on Public Law Schools, then Council Action Letter 02-05-1998) (last visited May
17, 2003).
413. In fact, even in 1997, the year before DC received provisional accreditation, the
entering class of forty-one had a mean LSAT/GPA of 142/2.63. See ABA’s Accreditation
Committee Report Regarding the University of the District of Columbia School of Law,
Appendix at 6 (2001), available at http://www.lc.org (accessed from homepage by selecting
ABA Accreditation Research, ABA Evaluation Reports on Public Law Schools, then
Accreditation Report 02-12-2001) (last visited May 17, 2003) [hereinafter DC Accreditation
Committee Report].
page report about moot court or trial advocacy or law review because there
was nothing notable to say. Coastal had not successfully competed in any
trial or moot court program. Barry, in contrast, has published its first law
review, and has become highly successful in state and regional
competitions in both the trial and moot court competitions.410 Barry had an
active clinical program, whereas Coastal was lacking in this area. Barry
owns beautiful new facilities, whereas Coastal was renting office spaces
and looking for a new site when the ABA was considering its application.
4. Barry Compared to Only Law School Provisionally Approved in
1998
The University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of
Law (DC) was provisionally approved by the ABA in 1998.411 While the
ABA Council denied accreditation to Barry in January 2001 (following a
favorable recommendation from the Accreditation Committee), DC was
provisionally accredited in February 1998, notwithstanding the
Committee’s unfavorable recommendation in January and April 1997.412 As
this section points out, the Accreditation Committee concluded in February
2001 that DC was still not in compliance with three of the same four
standards the ABA Council had used the previous month to reverse the
Committee’s favorable recommendation and to deny accreditation to
Barry.413
According to the Council’s report, DC was formed by a merger of the
District of Columbia School of Law, a freestanding law school, and the
68 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1
414. See id. at 1. Historically, the law school began as the Antioch School of Law in
1972, and was dedicated to providing a legal education to minority students and legal
services to poor residents of Washington, D.C. In 1988, the school became independent as
the District of Columbia School of Law and gained provisional ABA approval in 1991. After
merging into the University of the District of Columbia in 1995, the ABA required an
application for new provisional accreditation, which was finally granted in 1998. See id. at
3. It has been designated a historically black institution. See id. at 1.
415. See id. at Appendix 1.
416. See id. at Appendix 15-16. The Accreditation Committee concluded that DC did
not comply with Standards 301, 303(c), and 501(b), “because the School is admitting
applicants who do not appear capable of satisfactorily completing the educational program
and being admitted to the bar, and being employed as practicing members of the bar.” Id.
The Committee noted that the “credentials of the students are among the weakest in the
nation.” Id. at Appendix 5. By 1999, the entering class of eighty-eight had a mean
LSAT/GPA of 141/2.68, with the LSAT/GPA 25th percentiles at 138/2.36. The Fall 2000
class had LSAT/GPA percentiles at 142/2.5. Id. at Appendix 5-6. Bar exam passages rates
were also a concern. “While the School attributes its bar passage results in part to its mission
to provide access to students from underrepresented groups and its willingness to accept
more at-risk students than most traditional law schools, it also acknowledges that its bar
passage rate is disproportionately low even given the characteristics of the student body.”
Id. at Appendix 6. The Accreditation Committee also concluded that DC did not comply
with Standards 601, 604 and 606, “because of the fiscal and space constraints and the severe
understaffing and insufficient collection of the library;” and Standard 201(a) due to “the
present and anticipated financial resources . . . do not appear adequate . . . .” Id. at Appendix
16.
417. Id. at Appendix 16-17.
418. Id. at 7-8. The three standards of noncompliance were still 301, 303(c), and
501(b), relating to the admission of applicants, attrition and bar passage rates.
University of District of Columbia School of Law.414 Located in the
facilities that housed DC’s predecessor law school renovations were made
after provisional accreditation was granted. As part of the ABA’s annual
review of provisionally accredited law schools, the Accreditation
Committee reviewed a Site Team report from an April 9 through April 12,
2000, visit and issued a Report dated November 2000.415 The Committee
concluded that although “the Spring, 2000 site evaluation report and Dean
Broderick’s update on the School’s situation shows progress,” DC was still
not in compliance with seven standards.416 The Committee requested that
school representatives appear at a meeting “to show cause why the School
should not be required to take appropriate remedial action, placed on
probation, or removed from the list of [approved] law schools . . . .”417 A
subsequent report, dated January, 2001, concluded that DC was still not in
full compliance with three standards, but the Committee ceased any threat
of probation or removal due to the school’s progress.418 The report also
noted that DC had only gained internet access in 2000, and planned to
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422. See Accreditation Committee Report Regarding DC, available at http://www.lc.org
(accessed from homepage by selecting ABA Accreditation Research, ABA Evaluation
Reports on Public Law Schools, then Site Team Report 08-07-2001) (last visited May 17,
2003) [hereinafter DC Site Report]. The ABA sends a site team annually to each
provisionally accredited school until full accreditation is obtained or until provisional
accreditation is withdrawn. A law school has five years from provisional accreditation to
obtain full accreditation.
423. See 2001 ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 828
(2001).
424. See DC Site Report, supra note 422, at 39.
network computers for building-wide internet access and access to an on-
line library catalog system.419 The library collection had increased from
171,791 volumes and volume equivalents in 1999 to 184,000 in 2000.420
The school was also directed to attend to matters involving financial
resources, and the requirement that the law school must qualify for full
approval within five years of provisional approval.421 A forty page report
was prepared based on a Site Team visit to DC in April, 2001.422 DC had
a 26% bar passage rates for summer 1999 and winter 2000 exams.423 The
site team’s report noted:
[T]he most serious problem still confronting . . . [the School] . . .
is the recruitment and retention of quality law students in a brutally
competitive market. . . . While the University and the School of
Law seem willing to admit another class of 40 first-year students
if necessary to improve quality, there is widespread skepticism
about the long-term viability of the School with such a small
entering class. . . . The School needs to bend every effort to move
toward its eventual goal of 100 students per entering class, yet
remaining true to its public interest mission and its key role of
providing access to legal education for the disadvantaged citizens
of the District of Columbia. Accomplishing all these ends will not
be easy, but certainly appears possible.424
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425.  Id. at 38, 40.
426. Id. 
427. See Committee Report No. 1, supra note 227.
428.  The fact that the Council finally approved Barry in February 2002, does not
diminish this argument. The Council should not have denied Barry in February 2001, nor
should the Accreditation Committee have taken a 180 degree turn following the Council’s
denial by recommending against provisional approval based on competition concerns. The
fact that the Council finally relented to overwhelming pressure from many sources does not
relieve the ABA of its actions.
429. Portinga, supra note 1, at 669.
430.  Jefferson Parrish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (citing United States
v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-47 (1962)). 
The report further noted that the “level of staff support remains low,
though improvements are on the way.”425 Plus, the facilities, “long a
problem bedeviling the administration, students and faculty, are now
adequate for its mission and program, though continued improvements are
needed and planned.”426 In contrast, Barry occupies four buildings built in
1995 that are well-maintained to this day.427
When comparing the above data, it becomes quite obvious that the
Council subjected Barry to unfair treatment and engaged in impermissible
anti-competitive behavior when it denied Barry accreditation.428 There is no
rational, objective reason for the ABA’s actions in respect to Barry.
D. The ABA’s Accreditation Process Injures the Legal Profession
The actions of the ABA clearly injured Barry and its students. The
question that must be addressed in any antitrust claim is whether the injured
party has also suffered an antitrust injury. 
1. The Market
“[T]he ABA is the gatekeeper to the legal profession.”429 “[I]f the
government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a
product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere
gives the seller market power.”430 The ABA is recognized in most states as
the only law school accrediting organization. The ABA indeed has market
power.
When the seller’s share of the market is high, or when the seller
offers a unique product that competitors are not able to offer, the
Court has held that the likelihood that market power exists and is
being used to restrain competition in a separate market is sufficient
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431. Id. at 17 (citations omitted). 
432. See ABA-Approved Schools, available at http://www.abanet.org (accessed from
homepage by selecting Law Student Resources, Legal Education, ABA-Approved Schools,
then FAQs) (last visited May 7, 2003); see also supra note 2. George Leef, Free the Law
School Market and the Public Will Benefit, Apr. 5, 2003, available at http://www.cato.org
(accessed from homepage by entering “free the law school market” in the search engine) (last
visited May 17, 2003).
433. The Orange County Bar Association filed a petition with the Florida Supreme
Court requesting a change in the licensing rule so that students at any Florida law school
could become licensed if their law school became ABA accredited within twelve months of
the ABA’s decision to grant accreditation so long as the original site team visit on which the
decision is based occurred within twelve months of graduation. See Petition of Orange
County Bar Association and Thomas B. Drage, Jr., Esq., et al., Petition to Amend Rules 2-
11.1 and 4-13.2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar, No.
SC02-2354 (Fla. Oct. 23, 2002), available at http://www.lc.org (accessed from homepage
by selecting ABA Accreditation Research then Petition of Orange County Bar Association
to Change Florida Supreme Court Rules) (last visited May 12, 2003).
434. See In re Barry Univ. Sch. of Law, 821 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 2002) (ruling that those
students who graduated more than twelve months prior to the ABA granting provisional
accreditation on February 4, 2002, may not take the Florida bar exam, and those who already
sat for the exam, but whose scores were impounded until such time as the ABA conferred
provisional approval, may not have their exam scores released).
435. Since Barry is located in central Florida, the market at a minimum concerns this
area.
436. The Council focused on the introduction of FAMU, a state approved law school,
which at the time of the Council’s first deliberation in February 2001, was almost two years
away from its inaugural class that began in August 2002. See Council Transcript, supra note
255, at 41, 46, 67.
437. See id. at 46, 67.
to make per se condemnation appropriate.431
Almost every state requires graduation from an ABA-accredited law school
in order to sit for the bar exam.432 Indeed, 109 Barry students who
graduated prior to the school obtaining provisional approval from the ABA
run the risk of not becoming licensed.433 The market in Barry’s case is, at
a minimum, central Florida.434 This is the market that the Council was so
concerned about.435 The Council questioned whether the students primarily
came from Florida at large or from the surrounding seven counties.436 The
Council was concerned about the impact of a competitor school in central
Florida.437
2. Interstate Commerce
The Sherman Act “was intended to reach activities that, ‘while wholly
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438. McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980).
439. Constr. Aggregate Transp., Inc. v. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 710 F.2d 752, 766
(11th Cir. 1983).
440. Id. at 766 n.29 (citation omitted).
441. See Rule 9, supra note 54 (providing for the payment of fees by law schools
applying for provisional approval).
442. See Rules 4(b)(9), 29, supra note 54 (providing for the payment of fees by law
schools applying for provisional approval).
443. See Barry Site Report of 2000, supra note 226, at 17.
444. See Jan Pudlow, Budding Legal Careers Put on Hold, 29 FLA. BAR NEWS 2, 1
(Jan. 15, 2002).
445. See Terry O. Roen, Law Students Have Faith that Barry Will Get Accredited, THE
FLA. CATHOLIC, July 26, 2001.
446. See Constr. Aggregate Transp., Inc. v. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 710 F.2d 752,
782 (11th Cir. 1983). 
447. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9 (1969)
local in nature, nevertheless substantially affect interstate commerce.’”438
“The jurisdictional requirement of the Sherman Act may therefore be
satisfied by proving either that the business activities occurred in commerce
or that those activities had an effect on commerce.”439 A challenge to
subject matter jurisdiction is resolved by answering the question: “Can
Congress prohibit the challenged conduct under the Commerce Clause? If
so, then the conduct is within the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman
Act.”440 Accreditation activities certainly impact commerce across the
nation. First, the ABA is engaged in interstate commerce. The ABA is a
nationwide organization. It is recognized as a national accrediting agency
by the Department of Education. The ABA regularly sends site teams to
various schools to conduct site visits.441 On several occasions the ABA has
sent Site Teams to Barry for a fee.442 Second, the law school, the students
and graduates are engaged in interstate commerce. Ten members of the
class of 2000 listed a permanent residence outside of Florida.443 One
student, a resident of Georgia, traveled to Florida during the week and
returned home on the weekends.444 Some students clerked with law firms
having a nationwide practice.445 The jurisdictional requirement of the
Sherman Act is met.
3. The Antitrust Violation Causes Injury to the Legal Market
Under § 4, a private plaintiff who demonstrates a violation of the
Sherman Act must also show an antitrust injury.446 “[Proving damages]
under § 4 the Clayton Act is satisfied by proof of some damage flowing
from the unlawful conspiracy; inquiry beyond this minimum point goes
only to the amount and not the fact of damage.”447 “[I]t is enough that the
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(citation omitted). 
448. Id. 
449. Standard 506(b) permits accredited law schools to accept students from state-
accredited law schools and transfer up to one-third of the credits required for graduation.
One other possibility is to find a school which accepts applicants into an LL.M. program
without the requirement of having obtained a J.D. degree from an ABA approved school.
Currently, the states of Louisiana, Michigan, and North Carolina allow those having a J.D.
from a non-ABA approved school, but who have obtained an LL.M. from an ABA approved
school, to sit for the state bar exam. See SUP. CT. OF LA. R. XVII; MICH. BD. OF L. EXAM’RS
R. 2(B)(2); N. C.  STATE BAR R. .0100.0105. Another possibility is to petition the Nevada
Supreme Court for permission to sit for the bar exam if the school which granted the J.D.
obtained ABA approval within three years of graduation. The petition must show that the
school in question provides an equivalent education to an ABA approved school. See NEV.
SUP. CT. R. 51.5.
450. For example, a professor or law librarian need not have a law license in order to
teach law. However, most law schools will not hire faculty who graduated from non-ABA
approved schools. Having faculty on staff from non-ABA approved schools would not bode
well with the ABA during the accreditation review process. There is an argument that the
ABA is immune from antitrust claims because the injury of not being able to sit for the state
bar exam flows from the state supreme courts which rely on the ABA. Thus, the injury, if
any, flows from the state, and not the ABA. While this argument might sound appealing at
first blush, it breaks down in several ways. First, challenging the process as applied to a
particular law school avoids state action because the state supreme court does not supervise
the day-to-day accreditation process. Second, challenging the ABA in respect to the injury
caused to those pursuing non-licensed carrier eliminates the issue of a law license, and thus
eliminates the argument that the injury flows from the state supreme courts.
451. See Benjamin Hoorn, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of
the Justification for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 462 (2001); see
illegality is shown to be a material cause of the injury; a plaintiff need not
exhaust all possible alternative sources of injury in fulfilling his burden of
proving compensable injury under § 4.”448
Without provisional accreditation, the rigorous law school training is
wasted. The dream to practice law or to otherwise effectively use a law
degree is dashed. The only hope of those who graduate from a law school
that does not timely win provisional accreditation is to start afresh and
plough through at least two more grueling years of law school.449 For the
most part, the injury and the additional aspect of stigma precludes virtually
all opportunity to practice law, and precludes most opportunities of
pursuing specialty legal education and other non-licensed job
opportunities.450
The injury to the legal profession occurs in many ways. Attorneys are
often the brunt of jokes, but it is interesting how an attorney becomes a
client’s best friend when successful. Allowing more attorneys in the legal
market will have the inevitable effect of driving down prices for legal
services.451 Many of the students at Barry desired to offer their services pro
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also Robert W. Bennett, Reflections on the Law School Accreditation Process, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 379, 383 (1995) (ABA accreditation process increases cost of law school
education); John S. Elson, The Governmental Maintenance of the Privileges of Legal
Academia: A Case Study in Classic Rent-Seeking and a Challenge to Our Democratic
Ideology, 15 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMM. 269 (2001) (arguing that the ABA accreditation
process needs reform and that the current process drives up the cost of legal education while
providing little practical training); Timothy W. Floyd, Legal Education and the Vision
Thing, 31 GA. L. REV. 853, 856 (1997) (stating that law school education focuses too much
on legal doctrine and not enough on the practice of law); A’Lelia Robinson Henry,
Inequality: Plessy v. Ferguson and the Dilemma of Black Access to the Public and Higher
Education, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 47 (1998) (arguing that the ABA accreditation process raises
economic barriers to African-Americans); Peter V. Lestou, Law, Education and Legal
Education: The Future of Legal Education: Some Reflections on Law School Specialty
Tracks, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 457 (1999) (estimating the cost of ABA accreditation to
be one million dollars). This cost estimate is extremely conservative. The minimum annual
cost of maintaining a library to meet ABA standards is one million dollars. This is due, in
part, to the fact that the ABA has not yet come into the computer age, where little used
volumes and rows of dusty book shelves are no longer necessary. The largest single
component comprising law school tuition is the maintenance of the law library. See George
Shepherd, No African-American Lawyers Allowed: The Inefficient Racism of the ABA’s
Accreditation of Law Schools, J. LEGAL ED. (forthcoming); see also Christopher T. Cunniffe,
The Case for the Alternative Third-Year Program, 61 ALB. L. REV. 85, 101-02 (1997)
(arguing that the cost of legal education is borne by the students and the market); Claudia
MacLachlan, Doing Well vs. Doing Good, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 4. 2000, at 50 (stating that
the median law school debt is $80,000 per student); Symposium, Legal Ethics, An Informal
Discussion on Legal Ethics, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 436 (1999) (stating that
students are forced to take high paying jobs to pay off law school debt and are thus
prohibited from serving the poor and middle class). ABA accreditation straight-jackets legal
education by not allowing alternative programs such as those allowed in California. See Josh
Ard, Serving over the Net: Legal Education over the Internet, 79 MICH. BAR J. 1050 (2000)
(arguing that on-line legal education, which is allowed in California, reduces the cost of
tuition and may provide legal education to groups typically denied such opportunity); Mark
E. Dykstra, Why Can’t Johnny Sit for the Idaho Bar?: The Unfair Effect of ABA
Accreditation Standards on State Bar Admission Requirements, 3 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 285,
289-90 (1995) (arguing that the ABA accreditation unfairly eliminates many qualified
graduates of unaccredited schools from the practice of law); Jeffrey S. Kinsler,
Correspondence Law School Grads May Practice in Wisconsin, 74 WIS. LAW 4 (Nov. 2001)
(stating that on June 4, 1998, Wisconsin amended its rules of admission to allow any person
who is eligible to take the bar in their state of graduation to take the exam in Wisconsin,
thereby allowing graduates of California-approved internet law schools the right to practice
in Wisconsin); Oliphant, supra note 222, at 843.
452. The Orange County Bar Association where Barry is located requires mandatory
pro bono service of all its members. The ABA recently honored the Orange County Bar
Association for its model pro bono program. Many of the students at Barry participate in the
Orange County Bar’s pro bono program as law clerks. See Affiliate Membership Application
and Article II, Orange County Bar Association Bylaws, available at http://www.ocbar.org
(noting that law students may join as affiliate members, but must provide pro bono service)
(last visited at Apr. 15, 2003).
bono, or at reduced rates.452 The resulting injury far surpasses those who
2003] ACCREDITATION PROCESS 75
453. See Shepherd, supra note 245 (arguing that ABA accreditation has proven to be
a barrier to minorities entering the legal profession, especially among African-Americans);
see also Robert E. Hirshon, The Importance of Unbundling Legal Services, 40 FAM. CT.
REV. 13 (2002) (stating that low and moderate income persons have a substantial need for
legal assistance); Michael D. Schattman, Picking Federal Judges: A Mysterious Alchemy,
96 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1584-85 (1998) (claiming that the ABA was brought into the
judicial screening process to “block the appointment of women and black” from the federal
bench); Jonathan D. Glater, Few Minorities Rising to Law Partner, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
2001, at A1. Notably, Barry University was recognized as the number one university in the
south for diversity of students; Robert Steinback, A Bum Rap from the Bar, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 8, 2001, at 1B (arguing that ABA accreditation eliminates minorities). See also
America’s Best Colleges, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 6, 2001, at 73. The ABA’s
political bias in the rating of nominees to the federal bench still continues. See James
Lindgren, Examining the American Bar Association’s Ratings of Nominees to the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for Political Bias, 1989-2000, 17 J. L. & POL. 1 (2001).
454. In re Petition of Culver, slip op. at 1, 4 (Mont. 2002).
455. Id. at 4-5.
456. Id. at 3.
457. A January 29, 1996 letter from the ABA Accreditation Committee to the
University of Montana School of Law concluded that the law school was “not in compliance
with the Standards.” See Letter from James P. White, Consultant on Legal Education to the
invested their lives to obtain a legal education. The poor, minorities and the
disadvantaged also suffer.453
VI. CONCLUSION
The ABA accreditation process must be reformed. The future and
integrity of the legal profession depends on administering fair and objective
accreditation standards. The recent trend appears to show a growing
dissatisfaction for the ABA accreditation process. However, state supreme
courts must take the matter of accreditation seriously. No longer can one
assume that the ABA is acting reasonably and in the best interest of the
public or the legal profession.
In February 2002, the Montana Supreme Court narrowly denied a
California law school graduate’s petition for waiver of the state bar rule
that require an applicant “must have a Juris Doctor or equivalent degree
from a law school accredited by the American Bar Association at the time
of graduation. . . .”454 In a 4-3 decision, the court declined to waive the bar
rule on ABA accreditation.455 The majority maintained that the court did
not have the “resources or expertise to independently examine the legal
education offered by law schools around the country.”456 Justice Leaphard
concurred, adding: “I do not favor changing the requirements for taking the
bar examination in such a way that the support for the University of
Montana School of Law457 will be eroded.”458 
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ABA, to Dr. George M. Dennison, President, University of Montana, Jan. 29, 1996, at 7 (on
file with authors). The Accreditation Committee listed six standards of non-compliance:
“Standards 105 and 201(b) and adopted interpretations thereof” regarding “[t]he adequacy
of resources available to support the educational mission”; and “Standards 601(b), 604, 605,
and 606” relating to the “adequacy of resources available to the law library.” Id. In addition,
the Accreditation Committee expressed concern with respect to eight other standards and
requested a report showing compliance with the standards by September, 1996. Id. at 7-8.
458. Culver, slip op. at 7. Justice Leaphard attended the University of Montana School
of Law. Id.
459. Id. at 9.
460. Id. at 12-13.
461. Id. at 13.
462. Id. at 17.
However, Justice Trieweiler issued a noteworthy dissent, in which he
criticized the ABA:
no empirical data has been offered to suggest that the ABA’s
standards correlate in any way to a quality legal education. What
is evident is that the monopoly given to this private trade
association to set standards for law schools increases the cost of
legal education, burdens new members of the profession with debt
that limits their options for professional and public service,
hampers innovations in the area of legal education, discriminates
against “working faculty” with practical professional experiences
to share with their students, and discriminates against non-
conventional students and minorities who do not meet the arbitrary
admission standards imposed.459 
Justice Trieweiler pointed to six ABA standards to illustrate his point
that ABA accreditation is unrelated to the quality of legal education
obtained.460 
[The ABA standards] are merely arbitrary standards established to
perpetuate traditional notions of who should receive a legal
education and traditional notions of full time law faculty who place
too much emphasis on producing grain silos full of worthless legal
literature every year and not enough emphasis on quality classroom
education.461
Justice Cotter, one of the two justices who wrote separate dissents,
noted that she expressed support for “most of Justice Trieweiler’s
comments.”462 Justice Cotter agreed “in particular with the contention that
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463. Id. 
464. Elson, supra note 4, at 269-70 (citations omitted).
there are valid, workable and relatively simple alternatives” to decide if an
applicant is qualified “without chaining ourselves to the ABA standards.”463
Professor John Elson, a veteran of many ABA Site Team visits and a
former member of the ABA Accreditation Committee, laments the current
state of ABA accreditation.
There is no cause: to celebrate a system that limits competition in the
legal services market so effectively that vast numbers of Americans
cannot afford legal services; to celebrate a system that is so costly that
the non-wealthy are either priced out of legal education entirely or must
take on tremendous debt; or to celebrate a system that fails to prepare
most students to meet the initial challenges of law practice.464
Lifting the veil of the ABA accreditation process reveals a system that
is arbitrary and lacking in predictability. Fairness and quality education
should be the hallmark of any accreditation process.
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VII. APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
ABBREVIATIONS
ALSDA - American Law School Deans Association.
ABA - American Bar Association.
Accreditation Committee - ABA Accreditation Committee of the Section
of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the ABA.
Accreditation Committee Report No. 1 - Report by the Accreditation
Committee following its meeting of January 26-27, 2001, regarding
Barry’s application for provisional accreditation.
Accreditation Committee Report No. 2 - Report by the Accreditation
Committee following its meeting of November 1-3, 2001, regarding
Barry’s application for provisional accreditation.
Barry - Barry University School of Law.
Barry Site Report (1999) - Report prepared by the ABA Site Team
regarding Barry University School of Law for site visit in 1999.
Barry Site Report (2000) - Report prepared by the ABA Site Team
regarding Barry University School of Law for site visit in 2000.
Barry Supplemental Site Report (2001) - Report prepared by the ABA Site
Team regarding Barry University School of Law for site visit in 2001.
Board - Thirty-seven member governing Board of Governors of the ABA
which governs the ABA between meetings of the House of Delegates.
Coastal Report - Florida Coastal Site Report prepared by the ABA Site
Team regarding Florida Coastal School of Law.
Committee - ABA Accreditation Committee of the Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar of the ABA.
Consent Decree - Consent Decree entered into by the DOJ and the ABA on
June 27, 1995, and approved by the court on June 25, 1996.
Council - Governing body of the Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar of the ABA Council Action Letter - Letter
issued by the Council regarding its decision on accreditation.
Council Transcript - Council of the Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar of the ABA on February 17, 2001.
DC - District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law.
DC Accreditation Report - Report prepared by the ABA Accreditation
Committee regarding the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School
of Law.
DC Site Report - Report prepared by the ABA Site Team regarding the
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District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law.
DOE - United States Department of Education.
DOE Transcript - Transcript of National Advisory Committee on
Institutional Quality and Integrity dated June 8, 1998.
DOJ - United States Department of Justice.
FAMU - Florida A&M University.
Findings- Findings made in the Site Team Report.
HEA - Higher Education Act.
House - ABA House of Delegates, the governing board of the ABA, which
meets twice per year, consisting of 530 members.
LSAC - Law School Admission Council.
LSAT - Law School Admission Test.
Modified Consent Decree - Consent Decree entered into by the DOJ and
the ABA on June, 27, 1995, approved by the court on June 25, 1996,
and modified by the court on February 16, 2001.
Report by Diane C. Yu - Report issued by Diane C. Yu, Chairperson of the
Council, following the Council’s denial of Barry’s application for
provisional accreditation.
Rules or Rule - Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools by the
American Bar Association SACS - Southern Association of Colleges
and Schools.
Section - Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the
ABA.
Standards - ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools of the American
Bar Association.
UNLV Site Report - Report prepared by the ABA Site Team regarding
William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada at Las
Vegas.
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465. See Rule 25(a), supra note 54.
466. See Letter From Sebert, supra note 19.
APPENDIX B
EXPOSING THE ABA’S REPORTS ON PUBLIC LAW SCHOOLS: FOCUSING
ON INPUTS RATHER THAN OUTPUTS
ABA reports and letters to law schools are sometimes difficult to obtain
due to the ABA’s rule that “matters relating to the accreditation of a law
school shall be confidential. . . . [including] all non-public documents and
information received or generated by the American Bar Association.”465 In
August 2001, after being notified that various public law schools had
received public records requests for documents relating to the accreditation
process, the ABA sent a memo to the deans of ABA approved law schools
reminding them of the confidentiality rule. The memo stated:
[A]lthough under Rule 25 it is within the school and university’s
discretion to release such documents publically, we understand that
the common practice of most law schools and universities has been
not to release such accreditation documents unless required to do
so under applicable public records disclosure legislation.
The interpretation of applicable public records disclosure
legislation is, of course, a matter for each individual law school
and university. . . . We have been informed, however, that under
some public records statutes it has successfully been argued that
ABA accreditation documents are not subject to compelled
disclosure under the statute because the documents were not
generated by an entity that is subject to the statute. 
If your law school or university does release any ABA
accreditation documents, please notify our office.466
Perhaps the ABA’s veiled attempt to keep the law school documents
from being released is to keep their arbitrary decision-making process
private. The ABA protects itself from public scrutiny by draping the
accreditation process in a cloak of secrecy. Most public law schools do
comply with the public records laws in their state, and release the
accreditation reports as required.
The ABA’s own reports show that the ABA continually attempts to
micromanage law schools by focusing more on inputs rather than outputs.
Although no attempt has been made to be exhaustive, the following reports
show that universities and their associated law schools must go to great
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467. See Arizona State University Accreditation Committee Report 4 (Nov. 1999) (on
file with authors).
468. See Florida State University College of Law Accreditation Committee Report 8
(June 2001) (on file with authors).
469. Id. at 8. Florida State University Law School dean, Don Weidner, commented:
“One of the aspects of the ABA process that has been controversial is the extent that they are
focusing on inputs rather than on outcomes.” Scott Powers, Barry Isn’t Alone in ABA Clash,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 2001, at A1.
470. See University of Florida College of Law Accreditation Committee Report 2 (Jan.
2001) (on file with authors).
471. Id. at 4.
472. Id. at 1-2. After an investigative reporter for the Orlando Sentinel obtained the
University of Florida’s accreditation documents by a public records request, the Editorial
Board, wrote: “The ABA’s current rules lack specificity and appear to vary considerably
depending on who is interpreting them. . . . Why should a public university—such as
UF—have to spend $20 million to expand its facility to the ABA’s definition of appropriate
square footage?” Editorial Board, ABA is Micromanaging, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 8,
lengths to appease the ABA. 
The Accreditation Committee issued a November 1999 report regarding
Arizona State University College of Law (ASU). The report concluded
that ASU needs “to improve acoustics in the physical plant.”467
In the Accreditation Committee’s June 2001 report about Florida State
University College of Law, the committee found noncompliance with the
Standards because the school did “not afford to full-time clinical faculty
non-compensatory perquisites [voting rights] reasonably similar to those
provided other full-time faculty members.”468 The Committee also found
that issues involving other Standards (relating to library resources, the
increasing use of adjunct professors, class sizes of up to 125 students,
coupled with a “tight budgetary climate” and a decline in the number of
minority students merited) required “close attention and review.”469
A January 2001 Accreditation Committee Report regarding the
University of Florida College of Law concluded that the law library
“continues to be insufficient in size, location, and design to accommodate
its students and faculty. . . . This inadequacy has a negative and material
effect of [sic] the education University of Florida law students receive.”470
The Committee requested that the administration appear at the April 2001
Committee meeting to “show cause why . . . the College of Law should not
be required to take appropriate action, be placed on probation, or be
removed from the list of law schools approved by the American Bar
Association.”471 After the April 2001, meeting was held, the Committee
concluded that although the school developed a plan to build a 57,400
square foot library addition, the school would continue to be out of
compliance until the building was occupied.472 
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2001, at A10; see also Powers, Barry Isn’t Alone in ABA Clash, supra note 469 (discussing
the FSU and UF reports).
473. See University of Georgia School of Law Accreditation Committee Report 3-4
(Apr. 2001) (on file with authors).
474.  Id.
475.  University of Houston Law Center Accreditation Committee Report 8-9 (Apr.
2000) (on file with authors).
476.  Id. at 2.
477.  Id. 
478. University of Mississippi School of Law Accreditation Committee Report 10
(Nov. 1998) (on file with authors).
Since at least 1999, the Accreditation Committee has advised the
University of Georgia School of Law about the Committee’s conclusion
that the law library facilities are inadequate. In April 2001, the Committee
issued a request that the school show cause that it should not be sanctioned
in some manner by the ABA for noncompliance.473 The Dean responded
that the school was working to secure funding for planned renovations, but
maintained that there was no “evidence whatsoever that these challenges
are having a negative and material effect on the education received by our
students.”474 
In April 2000, the University of Houston Law Center was advised by
the ABA Accreditation Committee that it was not in compliance with three
standards. Concerns included short-term contracts for clinical instructors,
the understaffed library, and the “adequacy of the library collection.”475 By
April 2001, due to additions of staff and an increase of $350,000 for the
library budget, the Committee found only one area of noncompliance. The
report noted: “[c]onsistent with the wishes of the faculty, monograph
expenditures have increased sevenfold, to over $140,000 per year.”476 The
only remaining concern was with the lack of voting privileges of clinical
faculty, and questions about the LL.M. program.477
In a November 1998 report regarding the University of Mississippi
School of Law, the Accreditation Committee expressed concern about the
adequacy of the physical facilities (mainly about a sagging roof and library
crowding) and regarding the admission and attrition of minorities. The
report noted that the average LSAT scores for minority and non-minority
students were 147 and 154 respectively. The Committee concluded that the
law school was not in compliance with two standards due to the high
turnover rate and lack of professional staff in the library.478 
In a January 2001 report, the Committee found that the University of
Nebraska College of Law was not in compliance with Standard 212
because the school had not yet installed a door containing magnetic strips
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479. University of Nebraska Accreditation Committee Report 1 (Jan. 2001) (on file
with authors).
480. Id. at 13 app.
481. Id. at 1.
482. Id. at 12.
483. Id.
484. See University of North Carolina School of Law Accreditation Committee Report
1 (Apr. 2000) (on file with authors).
485. Id. at 15.
486. University of North Dakota School of Law Accreditation Committee Report 8-9
(Nov. 2000) (on file with authors).
487. Northern Kentucky University Salmon P. Chase College of Law Accreditation
Committee Report 14 (Nov. 1996) (on file with authors).
to provide “full disability access”479 despite the fact that the school’s
ADA’s Compliance Officer informed the ABA that the door was “in
compliance with the Americans for Disabilities Act Architectural
Guidelines.”480 The school also reported that the type of door which the
ABA requested would cost around $22,000.481 The report also cited the law
school for non-compliance with Interpretation 212-1 of Standard 212, in
that “vertical access within both buildings of the Law School is not
accessible to mobilely challenged persons.”482 The Dean maintained that
the students did have access to both buildings by taking the elevator in one
of the buildings and following an internal path from that building to the
adjacent building.483
In April 2000 the Committee even found fault with one of the nation’s
oldest law schools.484 The University of North Carolina School of Law
has been ABA approved since 1928. Since 1993, the Committee
complained about the facilities and continued to find the school out of
compliance until an over $10 million dollar construction project was
completed in 2000.485
The Committee faulted the University of North Dakota School of
Law in 2000 with violating five standards, involving “the inadequacy of
financial resources,” students being paid and receiving credit for legislative
externships, failure to regularly offer courses that are listed in the school’s
catalog, and inadequacy of the library facilities.486 
The Northern Kentucky University Salmon P. Chase College of
Law was found in violation of Standard 201, because of the “present and
anticipated financial resources” were not adequate, although the school had
made progress in increasing funding.487 The Committee made this
conclusion citing to two Findings of Fact. One Finding simply mentioned
that over $90,000 had been raised from the government and private
foundations for clinical programs and that $100,000 was gained from
restructuring. The other Finding stated that a grant of $180,000 was being
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488. Id.
489. Ohio State University College of Law Accreditation Committee Report 7 app.
(Apr. 1998) (on file with authors).
490. University of Oklahoma College of Law Accreditation Committee Report 25, 33-
34 app. (Apr. 2001) (on file with authors).
491. University of South Carolina School of Law Accreditation Committee Report
Appendix at 12 (Jan. 2001) (on file with authors).
492. Id. at 2.
493. Id. at 1.
494. Wayne State University School of Law Accreditation Committee Report Appendix
at 1 (Apr. 2001) (on file with authors).
used to modernize computer systems. Evidently, the Committee concluded
that level of spending was insufficient.488 
In an April 1998 report regarding the Ohio State University College
of Law, the Committee cited noncompliance to two standards and
questioned possible noncompliance with a third.489 The issues related to
low student attendance in some upper level courses and library equipment
and storage space. The report also noted a need for improvement in moot
court facilities and temperature control, the quality of teaching due to some
superficial case discussions and excess lecturing, and the lack of clarity and
enthusiasm.
A Committee report dated April 2001 summarized actions of the
University of Oklahoma College of Law in response to the Committee’s
findings since November 1987. During that time, to conform to the
standards, the school spent over $17 million on new construction,
downsized student numbers from 690 to 499 over three years to achieve the
desired student/faculty ratio and guarantee sufficient library seating,
increased tuition by 15% to replace revenues lost from downsizing and to
increase faculty salaries.490 
Beginning in 1998, the Committee complained about the inadequacy
of facilities at the University of South Carolina School of Law.491 In the
January 2001, report, the Committee noted that the law school would
remain out of compliance with the standards until the required building
renovations or new construction was completed.492 The school plans to
raise approximately $40 million dollars for a new law school facility to
comply with ABA Standards.493 
In an April 2001, report, the Committee noted that renovation and
construction of a new 54,000 square foot building brought the Wayne
State University School of Law into compliance with ABA Standards.494
In 1999, the Committee opined that the University of Wisconsin Law
School is out of compliance with four standards “in that the Law Library
is understaffed and does not have sufficient resources to provide either
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495. University of Wisconsin Law School Accreditation Committee Report 10 (Nov.
1999) (on file with authors).
496. Id.
497. In 1990, it cost $7.5 to $10 million to build a law library in the Midwest. See
Oliphant, supra note 222, at 866.
498. See id. (“[T]echnology and the Internet have dramatically changed the legal
research game while the ABA accreditation standards have yielded only slightly to this
phenomenon.”).
499. See, e.g., In re Application of Bennett v. State Bar of Nev., 746 P.2d 143 (Nev.
1987). Nevada School of Law closed the month after the ABA denied it provisional approval
in April 1987, leaving graduates to petition the Nevada Supreme Court for a functional
equivalency evaluation. See id. While denial of accreditation can be devastating, the grant
of accreditation is a boon to a school. See, e.g., Richard J. Morgan, Lights Shining Brightly
at Law School, 9 NEV. LAW. 14 (Oct. 2001). Following provisional accreditation of UNLV’s
William S. Boyd School of Law, the Dean reported a forty-five percent increase in
applications. See id.
sufficient services or a collection that will meet the needs of the Law
Schools’ programs of teaching, research and service.”495 The Dean stated
that the financial problems would continue because the State’s budgeting
was on a two-year cycle.496 
Clearly, the mantra of the ABA Section on Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar and has continued to be “spend and build.” Much of
the focus appears to be on building bigger libraries.497 In the computer age
(which the ABA has apparently missed), there is increasingly less need for
bigger libraries stuffed with rarely-used books and journals (which
overstuffing lead to the need for continuous purging of unused materials).498
The size of libraries and number of volumes which the ABA demands
significantly increases law school tuition. 
Regardless of the length of time a fully accredited law school takes to
meet the ABA’s requirements, the law schools never lose the coveted
status. The ABA’s threats to those law schools to hold them to their
Standards appear to have no teeth. However, law schools take these threats
very seriously. The key to a law school’s survival is to maintain ABA
accreditation. Without ABA approval, the doors to the legal profession are
slammed shut. The ABA’s arbitrary application of the Standards to new law
schools, and its steadfast refusal to accredit while schools are attempting
to comply with ABA demands, can have catastrophic consequences.499
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APPENDIX C
COMPARISON CHART OF BARRY TO OTHER LAW SCHOOLS RECEIVING
PROVISIONAL ACCREDITATION SINCE 1998: ILLUSTRATING THE
ARBITRARY APPLICATION OF ABA STANDARDS
ABA STANDARD BARRY1 ASL2 UNLV3 COASTAL4 DC5
Accreditation
Committee (AC)
concluded that each
school was in
substantial compliance
with every ABA
standard and
recommended
accreditation for each
school.6
The Council ONLY
denied provisional
accreditation to Barry.
•Feb.2001:
Provisional
accreditation denied.7
•AC - January 2001:
Barry is in
substantial
compliance. Must
fully comply in 4
areas to receive full
accreditation:
•301(a): Educational
program;
•303(a),(c):
Academic Standards;
•501: Admissions;
•505: Readmissions.8
•AC - November
2001: recommended
denial. Not
convinced Barry
could maintain the
same admission
standards because of
competition9
•Cited no areas of
noncompliance.
•Feb. 2001:
Provisional
accreditation
granted.
•AC Report
unavailable. Data is
from 2001 Council
meeting transcript.
•July, 2000:
Provisional
accreditation
granted.
•AC - Apr 2000:
UNLV m ust fully
comply in 8 areas to
receive full
accreditation:
•202(a):Self study;
•302(c): Curriculum;
•302(d): Clinical
program;
•303:Academic
standards;
•403: Faculty;
•405(a):Professional
environment;
•606: Library;
•701: Facilities1 0
•July,
1999:Provisional
accreditation
granted.
•AC - Apr 1999:
must fully comply in
5 areas  to receive
full accreditation:
•301(a):Educational
program;
•302(d):Clinical
program;
•303:Academic
standards;
•501(b):Admissions;
•701:Facilities.1 1
•Feb.1998:
Provisional
accreditation granted.
•AC - Feb 01, still not
in full compliance in
3 areas:
•301: Educational
program;
•303(c):Academic
standards;
•501(b):Admissions.1 2
•Needs sufficient
financial resources
and cites three
findings of fact on
which it bases its
concern.
•The next site
evaluation should pay
close attention to the
attrition rate of
students, bar passage
rates, job placement,
academic support
program, and the
“organization and
administration” of the
law school and how
the law schools
budget is controlled.1 3
ORGANIZATION
AND
ADMINISTRATION
(Standards 201-213)
•Started in 1995. 
•Affiliated with
Barry University,
started in 1940, and
run by women.
•Accredited by the
Southern Association
of Colleges and
Schools. Decisions
on academic
standards,
curriculum, teaching
and faculty are made
by the Law Schoo l.1 4
•“The atmosphere at
the Law School is
infused with a new
sense of confidence,
security, and
optimism.”1 5
•Administration is
“optimistic and
pragmatic and
possessed of strong
•Started in 1998. As
part of the Nevada
state college system,
UNLV it opened its
doors to its charter
class in1998, and
applied for provision
approval in August
1999, only one year
after opening. 2 1
•Funded 35% by
Nevada and 65% by
tuition/ fees.2 2
•Self Study: “in the
form of planning
statements in the
document that was
prepared after only
one year of
operation. Many
elements of program
not developed.” 2 3
•Started in 1996. 
•A private, for-profit
law school.
•95% of revenue is
from tuition and
fees. October 1998:
revenue - 7.9%
under projections;
expenses - up 2.4%.
1998-99 operating
income over $1
million.2 4
•Formed in 1995 by a
merger of the District
of Columbia School
of Law into the
University of District
of Columbia School
of Law.
•Jan and April 1997:
AC recommended
against provisional
approval.
•Feb 1998: gained
provisional approval.
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commitment and
determination.”1 6
•Self-study is
“comprehensive in
scope and articulates
goals and objectives
clearly.”1 7
•“Senior management
of the University has
expressed a
commitment to
expend the funds
necessary to develop
a quality program of
legal education, and
is committed to
financing significant
deficits in the near
term.”1 8
•University had
operating surplus
every year since
1981 and recen tly
raised $27 million
though a bond issue
and had an
endowment of over
$22 million.1 9
•Received state grant
of over $300,000 per
year for three years
for clinical
program.2 0
PROGRAM OF
LEGAL
EDUCATION
(Standards 301-307)
CURRICULUM:
•Traditional
curriculum requiring
90 credits.2 5
•“[P]rogram of legal
writing and analysis
courses is unusually
strong.”2 6
•Council complained
that a few papers that
students wrote
(before 2000 site
visit) for the upper-
class writing
requirement did not
meet the school’s
own policies (the
requirement was an
additional paper that
exceeds ABA
requirements).2 7
•Council complained
that there was “little
progress since the
October1999  site
visit in the
development of
challenging
examination
measures”2 8 But
CURRICULUM: 
•Fairly standard
curriculum of 92
credit hours
required.4 4
CURRICULUM: 
•Eighty-six credits
required for
graduation.
•“The upper class
curriculum was still
in the process of
development at the
time of the site
visit.”4 8
•“At the time of the
site visit . . . the
curriculum for skills
development had not
been finalized” but
the Dean reports that
they how have a
“plan for offering in-
house clinics and
externships.”4 9
CURRICULUM: 
•Fairly standard
curriculum of 87
credit hours
required.5 6
CURRICULUM:
•Fairly standard
curriculum. Ninety
credits required for
graduation.6 1 
•Not in compliance
with Standards 301
and 303(c) because
the school is
“admitting applicants
who do not appear
capable of
satisfactorily
completing the
educational program
and being admitted to
the bar.6 2
•AC noted:
(1) “relative ly high
attrition rate” due in
part to voluntary
transfers and low
admission standards;
(2) Seventeen percent
of 1999 admissions
were on academic
probation for a GPA
of 1.85 or below;
(3) The class of 2000
“did poorly on the
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Barry’s Dean had
mentioned
improvements in
exam composition
during the Council
meeting. A
committee of senior
faculty and the Dean
read all examinations
prior to
administration.2 9
•Because of the
ABA’s prior
complaint about
using open book and
multiple choice
exams, only six of
the exams given in
27 classes during
1999 contained some
multiple-choice
questions, five of 24
exams contained
multiple-choice
questions in 2000,
and no open book
examinations were
given. Other fully-
accredited ABA
schools also use
multiple choice
exams.3 0
•Council complained
that academic
support program was
implemented in
2000,3 1 but the 1999
site team reported on
academic support
program: “Two
faculty members
assist in the academic
support program.
Almost all the
students identified as
at risk who
participated in the
program are in
school and appear to
be much stronger
academically.” 3 2
QUALITY
OUTPUT:
•Many attorneys,
judges and professors
of other law schools
wrote letters to the
ABA, praising the
student’s
performance as law
clerks and
commented on  their
excellence in
QUALITY
 OUTPUT:
•Bar exam pass rate:
44.8%. State pass
rate for all takers was
68.8%.4 5
QUALITY
OUTPUT:
•No students had
graduated as of
accreditation date.
QUALITY
OUTPUT:
•No graduates by the
April 1999
Accreditation
Committee meeting,
thus no bar exam
scores at the time of
the Report. 5 7
•In 2000, 45% of
Coastal’s graduates
who took the Florida
summer 2000 bar
exams of the District
of Columbia,
Virginia, Maryland,
and New York.” Only
three of the 16
graduates passed the
first time.
(4) The applicant pool
for the fall 2000 class
was 375;
(5) The 25th/75th
percentile LSATs in
2000 were 142/147,
and the mean UGPA
was 2.95;
(6) School does not
have a full-time
recruiter and is
making plans to
develop recruiting
materials; and (7) Just
84% of graduates a re
working in law
related jobs.6 3
QUALITY
OUTPUT:
•Bar exam: 26% bar
pass rates for summer
1999 and winter 2000
exams.6 4
•Three of 16 of the
year 2000 graduates
passed the bar exam
the first time.6 5
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competitions.3 3
•77 graduates took
Florida Bar Exam
before accreditation,
but scores were
sealed by Florida
Supreme Court. 3 4
GRADING: 
•In the spring of
2000, Barry gave the
following grades in
required courses:
12% A, 36.5% B,
46.2% C, 4.5% D,
and .6% F.3 5
•Barry instituted a
mandatory mean that
requires no more
than thirty-three
percent of the grades
be awarded at B or
above.3 6
CLINICAL
PROGRAM: 
•Two in-house
clinical programs,
four externship
programs, and
several skills-
oriented courses.3 7
•State grant of over
$300,000 per year for
three years for
clinical program.3 8
LAW REVIEW: 
•Editorial board was
seated in 1997.
Published first
volume in 2000.
“The draft copy [of
the journal]
examined by the
team is a  positive
step.”3 9
MOOT COURT
AND TRIAL
TEAM:
•Moot Court teams
have advanced
against teams from
each Florida law
school with which
they have gone head-
to-head.4 0
•Two Moot Court
members recognized
GRADING: 
•Not mentioned in
Council Transcript.
CLINICAL
PROGRAM:
•Mandatory summer
clerkships offered
due to lack of
opportunities in
Grundy during
school year. 4 6
LAW REVIEW: 
•Announced
inaugural board for
Appalachian Journal
of Law in 2000.4 7
MOOT COURT
AND TRIAL
TEAM: 
•Not mentioned in
Council Transcript.
GRADING:
•Of the 1185 grades
in Spring, Fall, and
Summer sessions
(1998-99), only 35
were C- or lower
(2.9%); only 10  were
D (+ or -) (.8%) and
only one was F
(.08%). 5 0
CLINICAL
PROGRAM:
•The “required nine-
credit (now changed
to 10-credit)
lawyering process
course is deficient in
academic oversight .
. . .”5 1
•No students are
involved in faculty-
supervised clinical
courses.5 2
LAW REVIEW: 
•Editorial board and
by-laws developed
after 1999 site team
visit.5 3
MOOT COURT
AND TRIAL 
TEAM:
•Moot Court
developed after 1999
site team visit.5 4
•Trial Team not
mentioned; No
students were
involved in moot
court or trial
competitions.5 5
Bar Exam passed.5 8
GRADING:
•Adopted grade
distribution policy
for the 1997-98
academic year. 5 9
CLINICAL
PROGRAM:
•Established in the
year before
accreditation, but no
full-time permanent
clinical director.6 0
LAW REVIEW: 
•Not mentioned in
FAC.
MOOT COURT
AND TRIAL
TEAM:
•Not mentioned in
Committee Report.
GRADING:
•Not mentioned in
DAC.
CLINICAL
PROGRAM:
•Not mentioned in
DAC. Several clinics
are offered in 2001.6 6
LAW REVIEW:
•Biannual edition
began publication in
1992, before school
merger.6 7
MOOT COURT
AND TRIAL
TEAM:
•Moot court
participation satisfies
the second year
writing requirement.6 8
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as outstanding
oralists - one as the
top in the state.4 1
•Trial Teams earned
First to Ninth place
in six competitions
between 1999 and
2001.4 2
•Barry’s “strong
performance in
extramural trial
performance
competitions attest to
the value” of the
emphasis on trial
skills.4 3
FACULTY
(Standards 401-405)
•Student/Faculty
Ratio was 11:1 6 9
•Educational level of
faculty is
“impressive.” Ten of
the 22 full-time
professors had
LLMs, one JSD,
three PhDs and
several had Masters
degrees. Two
professors received
Fulbright
Fellowships for the
current year.7 0
•Several faculty
members have “well-
established
reputations as
scholars” and others
are “highly
productive scholars,”
having published ten
journal articles
between the 1999
and 2000 site visits.7 1
•Student/Faculty
Ratio not mentioned
in CT.
•Teaching loads at
Appalachian are
heavy.7 2
•Council questioned
ability to retain
faculty over time
because of turnover
rate.7 3
•Faculty involved in
intensive skills
courses have not had
very much time to
publish and
research.7 4
•Faculty tension,
especially in the area
of scholarship and
the selection of a
new dean.7 5
•Student/Faculty
Ratio was 17.5 :17 6
•“Scholarship may be
impeded by
involvement in
adminis trative
matters” and “faculty
involvement in
governance may
distract the members
from more academic
pursuits.”7 7
•Student/Faculty
Ratio 28:1 for fall
1997; 19.2:1 for fall
1998.7 8
•Mentions “lack of
prior teaching and
writing experience
by some faculty
members” but states
that the faculty’s
progress in
scholarship is
“noteworthy” in
light of the
“newness of the
school” and “other
demands currently
made of them.” 7 9
•Instruction ranges
from “fair” to
“excellent.”8 0
•Student/Faculty
Ratio unknown at
time accreditation
granted. A 9:1 ratio is
reported in 2002.8 1
ADMISSIONS
(Standard 501- 510)
•Concerns about “the
credentials of the
Fall 2000 and Fall
1999 entering classes
and the admission of
a number of transfer
students having law
school grade point
averages of less than
2.0.” (However none
were actually transfer
students).8 2
•1999: Concerns
about admissions and
recruitment.8 4
•Twenty-five percent
of the students
admitted in the fall of
2000 had LSAT
scores at or below
141; 25 percent of
those accepted for
fall 2001 entry had a
143 or lower. 8 5
•Based on the 2001
applications, the
•Council did not
express a concern
over admissions.
•The 25 percentile
of the LSAT/GPA
scores of the 1997
entering class was
138/2.4; and 25th
percentile of the
1998 entering class
was  143/2.3 . In
1997, students were
previously admitted
who were
academically
dismissed from other
law schools.9 1
•Not in compliance
with Standards 301
and 303(c) because
the school is
“admitting applicants
who do not appear
capable of
satisfactorily
completing the
educational program
and being admitted to
the bar.9 4
•Credentials of fall
2000 class had
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DIVERSITY: 
•37% of the students
and 30% of the
faculty members are
minorities; 43% of
faculty members are
female.8 3
LSAT scores wou ld
be essentially the
same as those in
2000.8 6
DIVERSITY: 
•Has racial tension
and gender
discrimination
complaint.8 7
•Located in all-white
region. African-
American professor
was the second
African-American
person ever to vote in
the county.8 8
DIVERSITY: 
•8% of the students
are minority.8 9
•Two of the 14
faculty members are
minority.9 0
DIVER SITY: 
•25% percent of
students are
minorities.
•Percentage of
minorities entering
declined from 39%
in 1997 to 24%  in
1998.9 2
•26% of the faculty
is minority. Eight of
the 23 faculty
members are female,
but all tenured
faculty are male.9 3
improved: 25th/75th
percentiles for LSAT
were 142/149; mean
UGPA was 2.95. DC
“plans to raise the
standards” for fall
2001.9 5
DIVERSITY: 
•61% of students;
about 50% of faculty
members are
minorities.9 6
FACILITIES
(Standards 701 - 703)
•Four well-
maintained buildings,
completed in 1995 on
20 acres in Orlando,
purchased by B arry
for $7 million, with
sufficient space
expansion.9 7 Four
classrooms with
seating for 200, two
seminar rooms and
an electronic
classroom. Moot
court room seats
140.9 8
•Grundy, Buchanan
County, Virginia, a
“very isolated rural
community”
approximately two
hours from the
nearest airport, one
and one-half hours
from a shopping mall
and one hour from a
bookstore.9 9
•Renovated
elementary school,
not sufficient for
permanent facility.1 0 0
•Two leased 2-story
office buildings,
which are adequate
for existing needs,
but not suitable for
full accreditation.
Plans call for
purchase of a
suitable building
site, contingent on
ABA provisional
approval.1 0 1
•Used facilities in
Washington, DC, that
housed predecessor
law school.
Renovations were
made after provisional
accreditation was
granted by the
ABA.1 0 2
1. Barry University School of Law, Orlando, Florida.
2. Appalachian School of Law, Grundy, West Virginia.
3. University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law.
4. Florida Coastal School of Law, Jacksonville, Florida.
5. University of the District of Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law.
6. Full compliance with all standards is required to obtain full accreditation.
See Standards, supra  note 67, at 102(a) (“A law school is granted provisional
approval if it establishes that it is in substantial compliance with each of the
Standards and presents a reliable plan for bringing the law school into  full
compliance with the Standards within three years after receiving provisional
approval.”); 102(b) (“A law school that is provisionally approved may have its
approval withdrawn if it is determined  that it is not in substantial compliance with
the Standards or if more than five years have elapsed since the law school was
provisionally approved and it has not qualified for  full approval. In extraordinary
cases and for good cause shown, the Council may extend the time within which the
law school shall obtain full approval.”).
7. The ABA finally provisionally accredited Barry February 4, 2002. See
Approved Law Schools, available at http://www.abanet.org (accessed from
homepage by selecting Law Student Resources, Legal Education, then ABA
Approved  Law Schools) (last visited May 17,2003).
8. See Barry Committee Report No. 1, supra  note 227, at 7.
9. See Barry Committee Report No. 2, supra  note 24, at 12.
10. See UNLV Report, supra  note 241, at 13.
11. See Coastal Report, supra  note 398, at 10.
12. See DC Accreditation Committee Report, supra  note 413, at 7.
13. See id. at 8-9.
14. See Barry Accreditation Committee Report No. 2, supra  note 24, at 12.
15. B arry Site Report of 2000 , supra  note 226, at 3.
16. Id. at 5.
17. B arry Accred itation Committee Report No. 1, supra  note 227, at 2.
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id.
20. B arry Site Report of 2000 , supra  note 226, at 8.
21. UNLV Report, supra  note 241, at 1.
22. Id. at 11.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Coastal Report, supra  note 398, at 2.
25. See Barry Accreditation Committee Report No. 1, supra  note 227, at 2.
26. B arry Site Report of 2000 , supra  note 226, at 9.
27. Letter from Sebert, supra  note 19, at 3.
28. Id. at 2.
29. See Council Transcript, supra  note 255, at 39.
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30. See Complaint, supra  note 135, ¶¶ 182, 185.
31. See Letter from Sebert, supra  note 19, at 3.
32. B arry Site Report of 2000 , supra  note 226, at 9-10.
33. See Attorney Letters, available at http://www.lc.org (accessed from
homepage by selecting ABA Accreditation Research, Complaint Exhibits, then
Attorney Letters) (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
34. See Complaint, supra  note 135.
35. See Barry Accreditation Committee Report No. 1, supra  note 227, at 3.
36. See id. at 10.
37. See id. at 2.
38. See Barry Site Report of 2000, supra  note 226, at 8.
39. Id. at 11. 
40. Complaint, supra  note 135, ¶ 257.
41. Id. ¶¶ 182, 185.
42. Id.
43. B arry Site Report of 2000 , supra  note 226, at 9.
44. See Appalachian School of Law Website, available at http://www.asl.edu
(accessed from homepage by selecting Prospective Students then Curriculum) (last
visited Feb. 17, 2003).
45. Complaint, supra  note 135, ¶ 285.
46. Id.
47. Id. ¶ 282.
48. UNLV Report, supra  note 241, at 3.
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